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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from the February 23 , 1995 final judgment 
llif I In i d Curu.il i ,itin. .'. .M| ... ,....]'. Lake City, Salt Lake 
Department), Honorable Sandra N. Peuler presiding. (Record 
("R, paue* 857-60) There were motions for sumit^  
' -, made by Plaintiff-
Respondent ("Sommer Eq.M) and by Defendant-Appellant ("Trans 
Tech"), Trans Tech denied, but Sommer FY] M «as granted in 
pari: December by the trial court immediately prior to 
the December 21, 1994 trial *R.pp.844-9) Trans Tech's motion 
during trial in i <•»< i nihiln* ! * • '.»." ti"inst;» cuivorsu summary 
judgment adjudications, was denied. Trans Tech's Notice of 
Appeal was filed on March 15, 1995. (R.pp.861-2) Jurisdiction 
s appeal is conferred by 
Rules 3 and 4, U.R.A.P. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1 Whether the trial court prejudicially errec 
violation of RiiJ e 56 , U.R.C.P., by" iiirikinci parUiil si -. r 
judgment adjudications an Sommer Eq.'s favor immediately prior to 
trial# but before discovery (i.e. interrogatories answers under 
oath by defendant Wayne Sommer.) had been r'nmpleted, "in*;! even 
•though only a fragmentary evidentiary record was before it whi ch 
nowise conclusively established that there were no "material" 
issues of faLl in lit- ji's.ill veil an tnc U tail i" 
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(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
2. Whether the trial court prejudicially erred in 
granting Sommer Eq.'s summary judgment motion in part even though 
its moving papers were in total non-compliance with Rule 4-501, 
U.C.J.A.? (DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
3. Whether the trial court prejudicially erred in 
refusing at trial to reconsider and vacate these partial summary 
judgment adjudications when defendant Wayne Sommer was finally 
ready to testify fully under oath and be subjected to cross-
examination by Trans Tech's trial counsel, and was prepared to 
orally testify to facts creating numerous "material" issues of 
fact incompatible with the prior partial summary judgment 
adjudications? (DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
4. Whether the trial court prejudicially erred in denying 
Trans Tech's motion to amend its initial pleadings, which was 
made well over a month prior to trial, and promptly after its 
counsel had finally received the critical written interrogatory 
answer under oath by Dale Mickelson1, and which asserted new 
legal claims arising out of the very same March, 1991 
transaction, which was based upon newly discovered evidence of 
the false notarization by Sommer Eq.'s then office manager and 
notary public, Wally (WW.M) Anderson?(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
JHe is erroneously referred to in the trial transcript as 
-Dale Nicholson"• See Tr. (Dale Mickelson) ("D."M") pp« i, 5-51, 
211-223. 
QB3\H6381.2 6/11/95-1 
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5. Whether the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing 
to try de novo at trial the critical issues whether the 
triplicate Purchase Agreement form, which Wayne Sommer testified 
at trial he had signed on March 1, 1991 in blank and had never 
been read by him, or explained him, was invalid, procedurally and 
substantively "unconscionable" and/or equitably unenforceable? 
(DE NOVa(STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
6. Whether Sommer Eq. is barred from enforcing any 
seller's lien it might have obtained during the March, 1991 sale 
of the Truck because of Utah's common law equitable principles 
(e.g. estoppel, unclean hands)? (DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
7. Whether Trans Tech's mechanic's lien on the Truck had 
priority over any seller's lien Sommer Eq. might have had? 
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
8. Whether the undisputed false notarization by W. 
Anderson that the illegible signature was that of the named buyer 
and owner, "Jack W. Sommer", rendered Sommer Eq.'s purported 
seller's lien rights "void" or "voidable"? 
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
A. Whether a "falsely notarized" signature of the 
stated buyer in the Utah Registration Certificate 
and Dealer Registration Record renders the 
recitation in the resulting Certificate of Title 
of a seller's lien in favor of "Sommer's Auto 
Wrecking" given by "Jack W. Sommer", void ab 
initio or "voidable" and accordingly, legally 
QB3\146381.2 6/12/95-1 
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incapable of giving "constructive" notice of any 
seller's lien on that Truck to an innocent 
creditor such as Trans Tech? 
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
B. Whether Sommer Eq.'s claimed seller's lien was 
validly "perfected" under the Utah Motor Vehicle 
Code? 
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
C. Whether the Purchase Agreement, signed Illegibly 
while the triplicate form was totally blank, by 
Wayne Sommer (not Jack W. Sommer) on March 1, 
1991, and subsequently erroneously filled in by 
Dale Mickelson and Wally Anderson on March 13, 
1991, as having the signature of the buyer-owner 
"Jack W. Sommer", was invalid under the U.C.C. 
and/or unenforceable because procedurally and 
substantively "unconscionable"? 
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
D. Whether there was, as a matter of law, no "fraud" 
in that March, 1992 sale transaction? 
(DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
9. Whether the trial court prejudicially erred at trial 
in refusing to allow full exploration of all the "material" and 
"relevant" evidence pursuant to Trans Tech's requests for 
declaratory judgment declarations in its initial (i.e. not 
amended) pleadings? (DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW) 
QB3\1*5382.2 6/11/95-1 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
This action was commenced during December, 1993 by Plaintiff-
Respondent Ted Sommer d/b/a Sommer's Auto Wrecking ("Sommer Eg.H) 
against defendants Jack W. Sommer (father) and Wayne Sommer 
(son)f and defendant-appellant Transmission Tech, Inc. ("Trans 
Tech")• (R.pp.1-5) Sommer Eq.r s Amended Complaint sought (1) 
recovery of the unpaid purchase price on a 1981 truck (the 
••Truck") allegedly sold by it to Wayne Sommer in 1991, but which 
was stated in the notarized sale documents to have been signed 
by# and purchased by, his father "Jack W. Sommer", (2) 
foreclosure of an alleged seller's lien on the Truck, and (2) an 
adjudication that its alleged seller's lien was superior to the 
mechanics lien of Trans Tech, which had made repairs on the Truck 
pursuant to Wayne Sommer's requests during late 1993. (R.pp.6-
17) 
Trans Tech filed and served an Answer, Counterclaim and 
Crossclaims seeking declarations as to, inter alia, whether its 
mechanics lien was superior to Sommer Eq.'s alleged seller's 
lienr whether Sommer Eq. was legally entitled to recover any 
money from Wayne Sommer, and whether Sommer Eq. had any valid 
enforceable seller's lien rights on the Truck. (R.pp.31-7) 
Wayne Sommer and Jack Sommer, despite their patent conflict-of-
interest, initially filed and served a joint Answer drafted by an 
QB3\146381.2 6/11/95-1 
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attorney representing both of them, which basically denied the 
allegations in the Amended Complaint. (R.pp.40-1) 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Sommer Eq., owned by Ted Sommerf the cousin of Jack W. 
Sommerr moved for summary judgment during June, 1994. (R.pp.133-
4) Both Sommer Eq. (during August, 1994) and Trans Tech (on 
October 5r 1994) moved to compel discovery by Wayne Sommer, who 
by then was representing himself pro se, and who had repeatedly 
refused to answer detailed written interrogatories served upon 
him. (R.pp.92-3, 287-8, 292-307, 332-40) Trans Tech's notice to 
submit its motion to compel for decision, was interposed on 
October 20, 1994, and Wayne Sommer was ordered by the trial court 
to answer them. Nonetheless, Wayne Sommer never at any time 
answered them. Eventually Trans Tech, nonetheless, moved for 
partial summary judgment adjudications on November 11, 1994 
(R-pp.410-68) and also had previously moved on November 10, 1994 
for an order authorizing it to file an Amended Counterclaim and 
Cross-claim based upon newly discovered evidence. (R.pp.382-7) 
Trial did not start until December 21, 1994. 
C, DISPOSITIONS AT TRIAL COURT 
On December 12, 1994 there was oral argument on the aforesaid 
motions and Wayne Sommer was present, without counsel, 
representing himself. (See I.Mem.Dec. (R.pp.748-52) p.l) 
Although this was not an evidentiary hearing, with witnesses 
being sworn in and subjected to cross-examination, the trial 
QB3\W6381.2 6/11/95-1 
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court nonetheless, immediately before trial, apparently made 
findings of fact based upon what was orally said by counsel and 
Wayne Sommer, but which was not in the formal evidentiary summary 
judgment record (see R.pp.105-61, 165-257, 410-68, 524-81): 
-There is no evidence of any fraud occurring in the 
transaction, as the undisputed facts presented at oral 
argument show the defendant, Wayne Sommer, to be the 
purchaser-debtor of the vehicle, and the same person who 
signed his name to the purchase documents. 
(I.Mem.Dec. (R.pp.748-52), par.2, p.2) 
!Ehis ruling was repeatedly adhered to during the trial, as the 
'trial court continually refused to allow contradictory evidence 
(e.g. via oral testimony of Wayne Sommer) to be sought or 
submitted. That pretrial decision did not, however, even address 
the legal impact of the key facts that both of Wayne Sommer's 
••signatures" were illegible and one was stated by the "notary 
public" to be that of "Jack W. Sommer" (not "Wayne Sommer"), who 
had personally appeared before him and signed the triplicate form 
applying for a Utah Certificate of Title to be issued in the name 
of "Jack W. Sommer"—which it (P-3) was. 
The trial court on December 16, 1994 granted Sommer Eq.'s 
•motion for summary judgment in part and denied Trans Tech's 
motions for partial summary judgment adjudications and to amend 
its pleadings. (See I.Mem.Dec. (R.pp.748-52), par.l, p.2) 
During the trial on December 21, 1994 the trial court refused to 
^reconsider" and vacate those adjudications, or to allow contra-
dictory evidence to be submitted. (Tr.pp.92-102, 231-3) At 
various junctures during the trial, the trial court barred 
QB3\«6381.2 6/11/95-1 
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questioning of witnesses concerning various "relevant- and 
-material- matters, upon the ground that those factual matters 
had been irrevocably settled, ala res judicata, by the pretrial 
partial summary judgment adjudications. (Tr.pp.33-4, 48-9, 90-2, 
119-20, 123-4, 187, 209-10) The trial court also denied 
defendant Wayne Sommer's motion to amend his initial counsel#s 
pleadings to assert in the light of the evidence developed at 
trial, the invalidity-unenforceability of the triplicate Purchase 
Agreement form which he had signed on March 1, 1991 while it was 
totally in blank, without reading the terms on the back sides, 
and without even receiving a copy of what he had signed (either 
before or after the blanks were filled in on March 13, 1991). 
But the trial court also denied that motion. (Tr.pp.133-4, 224-
5, 235-6) Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment on 
February 23, 1995. (R.pp.857-60) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. ALLEGATIONS, UNDISPUTED "MATERIAL- FACTS AND GENUINE 
POTENTIALLY "MATERIAL" ISSUES OF FACT IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RECORD AS OF DECEMBER 12, 1994 
On July 7, 1981 a Utah Certificate of Title (P- ) for the 
truck adverted to in Sommer Eq.'s Amended Complaint (R.pp.6-17) 
("the Truck-) was issued in the name of SLC Corp. (See R.pp.265-
83, Ex. 5) 
On September 24, 1990 Salt Lake City Corporation signed a 
document transferring, conveying and assigning all of its rights, 
QB3\M6381.2 6/12/95-1 
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title and interests as to the Truck to TNT Auction dba First Team 
Auction. (R.pp.265-83, Ex. C) On September 25, 1994 TNT-First 
Team Auction reassigned title to the Truck to Sommer Eg. (Id.) 
Sommer Eg. alleged in its December 23, 1993 Amended 
Complaint, inter aliaz 
"On or about March, 1991 Plaintiff sold to Defendant Wayne 
Sommer the following Vehicle ["the Truck0]: 
1981 Ford, Model-MHVF80, Body Type-CC 
8 Cylinder, Diesel, VIN-1FDXK84NXBVJ02644" (See Pl.Am.Compl. 
(R.pp.6-17), par.4) 
However, in point of fact, the Truck's Utah Certificate of Title 
(P-3)# as well as the underlying Utah Dealer Registration Record 
(D-2) and the Utah Registration Certificate (D-l), which were 
purportedly signed under oath by "Jack W. Sommer19 (not Wayne 
Sommer) and so notarized by Sommer Bq.'s office manager at that 
time, W. Anderson, all stated that the purchaser and new owner of 
the Truck was "Jack W. Sommer" (not Wayne Sommer). (See 
K.pp.410-68, 524-81; Pi. 2/16/94 P.D., Ex. E; Ex. 1; Answers of 
Ted Sommer to Trans Tech's written interrogatories, ("T. Sommer 
Answers"), numbers 11, 28; Answers of Dale Mickelson to Trans 
Tech's written interrogatories ("D. Mickelson's Answers") numbers 
5# 6, 13, 17, 18, 23 and Exs. B and C; emphasis added). 
The Amended Complaint also alleged: 
•Defendant Wayne Sommer caused title to be issued in the name 
of Jack W. Sommer, his father, with Seller as lien holder, 
QB3VHW81.2 6/11/95-1 
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copy of certificate of title attached-. (See Pl.Am.Compl. 
(K-pp.6-17), par.5) 
However, the evidence in the record supported a reasonable 
inference that this was "caused" by W. Anderson and Dale 
Mickelson, at that time employed by and representing Sommer Eq., 
with Mr. Anderson being its office manager, while acting in 
concert and collusion with Wayne Sommer, to "hide" the Truck from 
Wayne Sommer's creditors. (See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; D. 
Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29) 
Discovery accomplished prior to the December 12, 1994 oral 
argument of Sommer Eq. personnel (i.e. of the sole owner, Ted 
Sommer, and its then current office manager, Dale Mickelson) also 
reasonably proved via their respective under oath statements made 
in response to Trans Tech's written interrogatories to them and 
via the "material" written documentation appended to their 
answers, (see R.pp.410-68, 524-81), that: 
(1) The statements in both the Utah Dealer Registration 
Record (Ex. B (see also P-4, D-2)) and the Utah 
Registration Certificate (Ex. C (see also P-4, D-6)) 
that the Truck has been sold to, and was owned by, 
"Jack W. Sommer" [i.e. not Wayne Sommer], were false 
and were known by Wayne Sommer, as well as the two 
representatives-employees of Sommer Eq. involved in 
this sale, W. Anderson and Dale Mickelson, to be false 
at the time they were made under oath before the 
notary public, W. Anderson. (See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; 
QB3\M6381.2 6/11/95-1 
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D. Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5# 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 
29; T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28; emphasis added), 
(2) Dale Mickelson and the then office manager of Sommer 
Eq., W. Anderson, caused the aforesaid sale 
documentation to falsely state that the truck was sold 
to "Jack W. Sommer", while acting in concert and 
collusion with Wayne Sommer (See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; 
D. Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 
29, and Ex. A; T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28; 
emphasis added) 
On March 13, 1991 Sommer Eq., utilizing the handwriting of 
its aforesaid representatives to fill in the blanks on a 
triplicate VEHICLE BUYER'S ORDER AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
("Purchase Agreement") form (P-2, D-14), falsely stated, while 
knowing that the statement was false, that the Truck was ordered 
and agreed to be purchased bys 
••Jack W. Sommer 
1861 Dehamn Ln. 
Holiday, UT 8412M 
(See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 
13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29, Ex. A (see also Defendants' Exhibit 
D-14 (MD-14M)); emphasis added) 
!Phis Purchase Agreement stated that the salesman was MDr.", that 
±he "Purchaser's Signature" was that of, and made by, "Jack W. 
Sommer-f and that the agreement was "ACCEPTED BY" the "DEALER OR 
SALES MANAGER", DALE MICKELSON. (Id.; see also Pi. 2/16/94 P.D., 
Ex. D (i.e. D-14)) 
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This Purchase Agreement (P-2, D-14), drafted by Sommer Eq.'s 
employees (e.g. via their handwriting), was intentionally false— 
even according to Sommer Eq.—in that the purchaser was not 
really "Jack W. Sommer", but rather Wayne Sommer and the 
Illegible signature in the "Purchasers' Signature" blank 
purporting to be that of "Jack W. Sommer", was not his. (See 
R^pp.410-68, 524-81; D. Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 
18, 23, 28, 29, and Ex. A; T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28; 
emphasis added) 
Mr, Mickelson knew of the aforesaid intentionally false 
representations in that Purchase Agreement when he intentionally 
signed that Agreement as Sommer Eq.'s representative in that deal 
involving the sale of the Truck. (See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; D. 
Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29; T. 
Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28; emphasis added) Sommer Eq.'s two 
representatives-employees, who negotiated and carried out that 
deal on its behalf, were W. Anderson, then its office manager, 
and Dale Mickelson, its present office manager. (See R.pp.410-
68, 524-81; Ted Sommer's Answers, nos. 1, 5, 11, 17, 28) 
The Purchase Agreement (P-2, D-14) stated it had been signed 
by the purchaser of the Truck, "Jack W. Sommer". (See R.pp.410-
68, 524-81; Ex. A, D. Mickelson's Answers). However, in point of 
fact. Jack Sommer did not sign that document. Nor did he ever 
sign any document giving Sommer Eq. a seller's lien on the Truck. 
(See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; J. Sommer's Answers, nos. 1, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 22, 23) Nonetheless, the trial court found 
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prior to trial that the "... undisputed facts presented at oral 
argument show the defendant, Wayne Sommer, to be the purchaser-
debtor of the vehicle, and the same person who signed his name to 
lie purchase documents." (I Mem, Dec. (R.pp.748-52) par.2, p.2) 
TEhe trial court simply ignored the key undisputed fact of the 
*£alse notarization" on the Utah Dealer Registration Record and 
the Registration Certificate that the illegible signature thereon 
•was that of "Jack W. Sommer" {not "Wayne Sommer" who had 
personally signed in his presence. 
The March 13, 1991 Utah Dealer Registration Record (D-2, Ex. 
B) # filled out and signed upon behalf of Sommer Eq., Dealer 
Permit Number 2217, was intentionally and knowingly false given 
the evidence in that summary judgment record, in that: 
(1) The only named owner, "Jack W. Sommer", did not sign 
the par. 9 "affidavit" and the purported signature of 
his therein, at best, is a forgery. (See R.pp.410-68, 
524-81; D. Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 
23, 28, 29, and Ex. B; T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 
28; emphasis added); 
(2) The statement under oath in par. 9 of the affidavit 
"...that all of the above information is correct and 
complete..." was false in that Jack W. Sommer was not 
the "Owner" of the truck. (See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; 
D. Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 
29, T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28; emphasis added); 
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(3) The notarization of the purported signature of and by 
Jack W. Sommer in the par, 9 affidavit was 
fraudulently false in that Mr. Anderson knew that 
whoever made that signature in his presence was not 
Jack W. Sommer and that the purported signature was a 
forgery. (See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; D. Mickelson's 
Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29, and Ex. B; 
T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28; emphasis added); and 
(4) The statement in the blank in par. 6 that the 
LIENHOLDER'S NAME was SOMMER'S AUTO WRECKING was 
fraudulently false in that Mr. Anderson knew that the 
stated owner, Jack W. Sommer, had not signed any 
writing agreeing to the creation of such a lien on the 
Truck. (See R.pp.410-68, 524-81; J. Sommer's Answers, 
nos. 1, 6 through 13 (inclusive), 16, 17, 22, 23; D. 
Mickelson's Answers, nos. 5, 6, 13, 17, 18, 23, 28, 
29, and Ex. B; T. Sommer's Answers, nos. 11, 28; 
emphasis added) 
The March 13, 1991 Utah Registration Certificate (D-l), also 
containing an illegible notarized signature of "Jack W. Sommer," 
was intentionally false for the very same reasons. All of the 
aforesaid key trial exhibits are reproduced in the Addendum to 
this brief* One look is worth a hundred words! Nonetheless, the 
trial court found prior to trial that Wayne Sommer "... made no 
material misrepresentation on which Transmission Tech relied to 
its detriment." (I.Mem.Dec. (R.pp.748-52) par.2, p.2) The 
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reference to the lack of reliance wto its detriment" merely 
pinpoints the legal issue whether or not that fact is even 
•material" to the legal issues whether the Certificate of Title 
(P-3) obtained under the circumstances is "void or at least 
•voidable". 
B. FURTHER UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISHED BY TRIAL TESTIMONY 
The negotiations between Wayne Sommer and Dale Mickelson had 
started during February, 1991 (Tr. (D.M.) p.40) The Truck was 
taken by Wayne Sommer for its Utah safety inspection on the same 
date that he signed the triplicate Vehicle Buyer's Order and 
Purchase Agreement (P-2, D-14) (the "Purchase Agreement11). This 
was March 1, 1991. (See Utah Safety Inspection Certificate, D-6; 
Tr. (W.S.) pp.108-16; Tr. (D.M.) pp.21-7, 41-7). Wayne Sommer 
left with the Truck on the date that he signed those documents. 
(Tr. (D.M.) p.30) 
It was Wayne Sommer who had signed the triplicate Vehicle 
Buyer's Order and Purchase Agreement form (P-2, D-14) (Tr. (D.M.) 
pp.21-7) and at the same time had signed the triplicate 
application form for the Utah Certificate of Title, which 
included as two of the three parts thereof, the Utah Registration 
Certificate (D-l) and the Utah Dealer Registration Record (D-2). 
!Ehese signings were in Dale Mickelson's presence. (Tr. (D.M.) 
pp.27-30, 40-6) But W. Anderson did not sign and notarize that 
latter illegible signature as that of "Jack W. Sommer" until a 
few days later. (Tr. (D.M.) pp.27-30, 42-6) Ted Sommer was 
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aware that the notary public customarily certifies that the 
stated buyer was personally signing in front of him. (Tr. (D.M.) 
pp.62-4) Yet this "notarizing" in this instance occurred 13 days 
after Wayne Sommer had made the illegible signature which W. 
Anderson notarized as being that of "Jack W. Sommer." 
Jack W. Sommer did not sign the Utah Registration Certificate 
(D-l) and did not authorize his son, Wayne Sommer, to put the 
Truck in the name of "Jack W. Sommer." When he first learned 
what had happened in early 1992, he promptly tried, but without 
any success, to get Dale Mickelson and his cousinf Ted Sommer, to 
take the Truck out of his name. Dale Mickelson told Jack W. 
Sommer that it was Ted's deal. (Tr. (J.W.S.) pp.149-58; (D.M.) 
pp.35-9) W. Anderson, the notary public, died in 1992 (Tr. 
(D.M.) pp.36-7) 
The Purchase Agreement (P-2, D-14) called for the Truck's 
title to remain in Sommer Eq., but Dale Mickelson nonetheless 
decided to have the Certificate of Title (P-3) issued "in the 
name of Jack W. Sommer." (Tr. (D.M.) pp.41-2) Nonetheless he 
never sent the Utah Certificate of Title (P-3) to Jack W. Sommer, 
(Tr. (D.M.) pp.35-9) or to Wayne Sommer (Tr. (W.S.) pp.121-4). 
Nor had Dale Mickelson talked to Jack W. Sommer back in March, 
1991 about putting the Truck in his name. (Tr. (D.M.) pp.49-51) 
By 1992 the Truck was no longer running (Tr. (D.M.) p.39) as 
the engine had burned out (Tr. (W.S.) pp.125-7). Wayne Sommer 
had never been given any of the three copies of the triplicate 
Purchase Agreement form (P-2, D-14) (e.g. not back in March, 
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1991), even though it was customary to do so. One of those three 
copies was totally illegible on the back side where the "boiler-
plate* provisions, including the seller's lien, are contained. 
(Tr. (D.M.) pp.21-7; (W.S.) pp.121-4). Ted Sommer had bought the 
Truck for about $6,000 and it was sold in March, 1991 for $9,200. 
(P-2, D-14; Tr. (T.S.) pp.68-71) Wayne Sommer never paid even 
one cent towards reducing that March, 1991 debt, even though he 
was supposedly obligated to pay $500 each month until it was paid 
off. (Tr. (D.M.) pp.20-1, 130-2) 
C. DISPUTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
Wayne Sommer signed the triplicate Purchase Agreement form 
(P-2, D-14) and the triplicate application form for the Utah 
Certificate of Title on March 1, 1994—13 days before the 
notarization of his latter illegible signature by Wally Anderson-
s-while both forms were completely blank (i.e. nothing filled in). 
The price filled in was way too high, as Dale Mickelson had 
promised him that it would only be $1,000 over Sommer Eq.'s 
actual cost (about $6,000). (Tr. (W.S.) pp.108-16) He never 
even looked on the backs of any of the Purchase Agreement form's 
three front sheets and he was never given a copy (e.g. P-2). 
(Tr. (W.S.) pp.121-4) The Truck was not supposed to have been 
titled in his father's name. (Tr. (W.S.) p.140) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Certificate of Title (P-3) obtained from the state of 
Utah as a result of that false notarization that MJack W. Sommer" 
had in point of fact appeared before that notary public on 
March 13, 1995 and had signed his own name on the triplicate 
application form for the Utah Certificate of Title, rendered that 
Certificate of Title issued by the state of Utah in reliance upon 
-that -false notarization", "void" or at least "voidable". In 
either event, the Certificate of Title was not legally capable of 
giving the fictional "constructive notice" of the claimed seller 
lien of Sommer Eq. which would otherwise be effected by that 
Certificate of Title, since that seller's lien had been legally 
*perfected". 
The trial court ruled to the contrary that Sommer Eq. had a 
prior valid and enforceable lien, in reliance upon the erroneous 
common law principle that "constructive notice" would nonetheless 
legally flow from that Certificate of Title, unless and until the 
innocent creditor, Trans Tech, had point of fact relied upon some 
fraudulent misrepresentation(s) in the Certificate of Title. The 
trial court cited no legal authorities to support that necessary 
major premise in its fallacious reasoning and it is not the law 
in Utah or in this country as a whole. This error is decisive 
since Trans Tech did not learn of the purported seller's lien 
until after all of its work on the Truck had been completed. 
Accordingly, it had priority unless the fictional "constructive 
notice- doctrine gives Sommer Eq. legal priority. 
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The trial court's erroneous, but necessary, major premise is 
not only incompatible with well-settled common law principles in 
this countryf but the "public policies" embraced by the Utah 
Legislature in enacting (1) statutory provisions governing the 
applications for, and the issuances of, certificates of title for 
motor vehicles which require "under oath" acknowledgements before 
a "notary public" that the title owner of the motor vehicle 
actually signed the application form (2) the Uniform Commercial 
Code provisions governing the valdity of the Purchase Agreement 
(P-2# D-14) which supposedly is the genesis of the seller's lien 
of Sommer Eq. Wayne Sommer's trial testimony that when he signed 
illegibly the triplicate application form for the Utah 
Certificate of Title and the triplicate Purchase Agreement form 
on March lf 1991, they were both completely blank (i.e. nothing 
filled in), and that he was not given copies thereof, renders 
both documents legally invalid. 
Prior to the trial on December 21, 1994, defendant Wayne 
Sommer had steadfastly refused for months to give under oath via 
detailed written interrogatory answers, his version as to what 
occurred and why during the March, 1991 sale of the Truck. 
Nonetheless, there were sufficient undisputed "material" facts in 
the record before the trial court at the time of the December 12, 
1994 oral argument to mandate that it rule in Trans Tech's favor 
as a matter of law via partial summary judgment adjudications if 
Trans Tech's contentions as to what the controlling Utah common 
law principles were, had been adopted. The trial court's summary 
C}B3\1A6381.2 6/11/95-2 
19 
judgment rulings to the contrary are not only based upon 
prejudicially erroneous legal principles, but also bottomed upon 
genuinely disputed "material" fact issues. 
The trial court resolved prior to trial the crucial mixed 
legal-factual issue whether or not Sommer Eq. had under 38-2-3, 
Utah Code, a valid enforceable seller's lien on the Truck, which 
had priority over Trans Tech's mechanics lien for its 1993 repair 
work on the Truck. (See e.g. R.pp.6-17, Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint ("Pl.Ara.Compl."), pars.4, 5) But there were not 
sufficient undisputed "material" facts in that summary judgment 
record to justify the "yes" ruling of the trial court. (see 
I.Mem.Dec, R.pp.748-50) 
Those undisputed facts which existed in that summary judgment 
record as of December 12, 1994 were the result of the Answers to 
Trans-Tech written interrogatories given under oath (to basically 
the same sets of written interrogatories which also had been 
directed to Wayne Sommer, but not answered by him) (1) by Ted 
Sommer (the sole owner of Sommer Eq.), (2) by its then present 
office manager, Dale Mickelson, and (3) by Jack W. Sommer. (See 
copies thereof attached to Trans Tech's motion (R.pp.410-68), 
Exs. 1-3) W. Anderson, the "notary public", was by then 
deceased. Those undisputed "material" facts established as a 
jnatter of law that the aforesaid issue had to be answered "no" or 
at least mandated a ruling that "material" issues of fact existed 
-which had to be resolved at the trial. 
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Sommer Eq.'s legal rights, if any, to be paid more money vis 
a vis the March, 1991 sale of the Truck were only against its 
claimed co-conspirator, Wayne Sommer, against whom it obtained 
judgment after the trial. (See R.pp.857-60) The conspiracy 
involved in the March, 1991 sale of the Truck, according to 
Sommer Eq., was made up of Wayne Sommer, Dale Mickelson and W. 
Anderson (at that time the office manager of Sommer Eq.). There 
were, during the course of this conspiracy, false statements 
made, supposedly under oath, which were "falsely notarized11 by 
Sommer Eq.'s office manager, W. Anderson. Cf, e.g., 15A C.J.S. 
Conspiracy §§ 1-20. 
Any seller's "lien" purportedly created during the course of 
such a March, 1991 sale transaction, would be void or voidable 
and legally unenforceable (e.g. because of equitable estoppel, 
unclean hands) under Utah's common law equity principles, based 
upon and reflecting, Utah's "public policy" emanating from 
pertinent statutes passed by the Utah Legislature. The false 
1991 Utah Certificate of Title (P-3) stating that "Jack W. 
Sommer" was the owner of the Truck being repaired by Trans Tech 
during late 1993 and purporting to state that he had signed a 
valid written agreement giving a seller's lien on the Truck to 
Sommer Eq., was void ab initio or at least "voidable" by innocent 
creditors, not actually knowing of that seller's lien, such as 
Trans Tech. That Certificate of Title was legally incapable of 
giving the fictional "constructive notice" of that seller's lien 
to subsequent innocent lien creditors, such as Trans Tech, not 
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having actual knowledge of the purported lien. Cf., e.g., Lake 
Philaas Service v. Vallev Bank, 845 P.2d 951, 953-4, 957 (Utah 
App. 1993) (refused to enforce an invalid, inaccurate Utah 
Certificate of Title misstating who the owner was). (See post, 
sec.V) 
The Certificate of Title's (P-3) statements as to "lien" and 
"owner- were rebuttable, not legally conclusive, and the 
undisputed evidentiary record before the trial court—both in the 
summary judgment setting and later at the trial—rebutted them as 
a matter of law. (See e.g. post, sec.IV) This Court should 
adjudicate-declare, as a matter of law, that Trans Tech had a 
legal right to foreclose its mechanic's lien and to sell the 
Truck in a commercially reasonable manner in late 1993, because 
its mechanics lien had priority over any legal rights Sommer Eq. 
might have had vis a vis the Truck. 
The basic purpose of those states, such as Utah, which have 
enacted statutes governing the sales and transfers of legal 
titles to motor vehicles (e.g. requiring state issued 
certificates of title) involves "protecting the public from the 
evils arising from the unregulated use, sale and transfer of 
motor vehicles, from ...fraud and impositionM, and they are 
enacted by the state legislatures "...to lend stability and 
certainty in the business climate surrounding each transaction." 
50 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §40(1) (emphasis added). See also 
e.g., 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §26 
(w...legislative purpose to protect the public against fraud...") 
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Statutes governing the issuance of certificates of title are 
enacted "for the protection of" the public, including "those 
holding liens thereon, against fraud"* 60 C.J.S., supra., § 
42(1). The false Utah Certificate of Title (P-3) stating that 
-Jack W. Sommer" is the owner of the Truck, is incompatible with 
that basic purpose. 
Trans Tech is the holder of a mechanic's lien on the Truck as 
a result of the work it performed thereon during late 1993. 
Accordingly, it was among those creditors intended to be 
protected by the Utah Code's requirements relating to the sale of 
motor vehicles and in particular, the requirements concerning 
notarizations. 60 C.J.S., supra., §42(1)(c) points outs 
A certificate of title to a motor vehicle must be 
valid in its inception. While a certificate of title, 
issued pursuant to statute and valid on its face, may 
be voidable because of fraud, a certificate issued on false representations is void ab initio. 
(emphasis added; p. 291) 
!The -Jack W. Sommer" Utah Certificate of Title (P-3) for the 
Truck was issued, according to Sommer Eq., because of and 
pursuant to, "false representations" made under oath in the Utah 
Dealer Registration Record (D-2) and the Utah Registration 
Certificate (D-l). See also e.g., State v. Hudson, 793 S.W.2d 
B72 (Mo. App. 1990). (See post, sec.V) 
While the Utah Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.W) governs the 
sale of the Truck and the prerequisites for creation of a valid 
seller's lien in the Truck (see post, sees.Ill, IV), "perfection" 
of the claimed seller's lien on the Truck is governed by Utah's 
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motor vehicle registration statute. Cf. e.g., National Exchange 
Bank v. Mann, 260 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Wis. 1978); Milwaukee Mack 
Sales v. First Wis. Nat, Bk., 287 N.W.2d 708, 711-2, 714-5 (Wis. 
1980) (held seller never perfected its lien in truck as a result 
of buyer's fraud); 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Secured Transactions §§150, 
393, 440. (See also post, sec.V) Accordingly, the provisions of 
the Utah U.C.C. and the Utah Motor Vehicle Registration statute, 
must be read and interpreted in pari materia, Cf., e.g., Sterling 
Acceptance Co. v. Grimes. 168 A.2d 600, 602-3 (Pa. App. 1961) 
(involved dealer fraud concerning certificate of title). 
It was Sommer Eq.'s sequential office managers, W. Anderson 
and Dale Mickelson, who made the false statements that the 
purchaser-owner was "Jack W. Sommer" and that it was Jack W. 
Sommer who had indeed signed as "Jack W. Sommer" via the 
illegible signatures (e.g. in the notarized signature line). 
That is the heart of the fraudulent misrepresentation which 
voids, or at least renders "voidable", the Utah Certificate of 
title (P-3) issued by the State of Utah as a result of those 
misrepresentations. See e.g., The Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-
Door Corp., 247 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 35 (App. Sept. 7, 1994) 
(stated "fraud" issues render the written agreement "voidable"); 
Baldwin v. Barton. 850 P.2d 1188, 1193-5 (Utah 1993) (discussed 
-void" vs. "voidable" issue). Ona Intern. (U.S.A.1 v. 11th Ave. 
Corp,, 850 P.2d 447, 451-3 (Utah 1993) (held all the contract 
documents in the fraudulent transaction were invalid and 
"voidable"). This equitable common law principle renders just 
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results ala the "clean hands" doctrine. (See also post, 
sec.I.D.) 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
I- THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN GRANTING SOMMER EO. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE IT HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH ANY 
OF THE KEY PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OR ESTABLISHED THAT THERE 
WERE NO "MATERIAL" ISSUES OF FACT REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED AT 
THE TRIAL LESS THAN TWO WEEKS LATER 
Introduction 
Sommer Eq.'s June 29, 1994 motion for summary judgment 
adjudications that it had a valid and enforceable lien on the 
Truck and that this lien has priority over the mechanic's lien of 
Trans Tech (R.pp.133-4), was governed by Rule 56, U.R.C.P. (See 
antef p«6) Under subsection (c) thereof, Sommer Eq. as moving 
partyr had the burden of proving "••.that there is no genuine 
issues as to any material fact" and that it is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law" as to each and every one of those 
issues. Sommer Eg. failed to sustain that demanding burden of 
proof and accordingly, Trans Tech had no legal obligation to even 
submit at that juncture any responsive affidavit(s) or any other 
responsive evidence. Subsection (e) of Rule 56 specifically 
provides that it is only "(w)hen a motion for summary judgment is 
anade and supported as provided in this rule.,," that Trans Tech 
had an obligation to submit affidavits or other evidence which 
••••sets forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial-. Nonetheless, Trans Tech did have contradictory 
"material" evidence in the record as of December 12, 1994. 
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However, Sommer Eq. did not submit any supporting 
affidavit(s) (see R.pp.105-34), let alone one that would be in 
compliance with subsection (e) of Rule 56 (i.e., "...shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."). 
Nor did Sommer Eq. submit any documentary exhibits in support of 
its motion, let alone attach them to a proper affidavit 
containing the requisite foundation testimony by someone with 
personal knowledge (e.g. to authenticate the documents as genuine 
and true). 
Not only was Sommer Eq.'s motion for partial summary judgment 
adjudications in patent non-compliance with Rule 56, but it also 
vas in flagrant violation of Rule 4-501, C.J.A., which governs 
such summary judgment motions. (See ante, p.7) Subsection 
(l)(a) expressly requires that this motion be, inter alia, 
*...accompanied by...appropriate affidavits, and copies of 
citations by page numbers, relevant portions of depositions, 
exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the 
motion." Likewise, Sommer Eq.'s Memorandum did not comply with 
the requirement in subsection (2) (a) that it "...shall begin 
with a section that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which movement contends no genuine issue 
exists...[which] shall be stated in separate numbered sentences 
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon 
which the movement relies". (See R.pp.105-32) Trans Tech had no 
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real idea# as is guaranteed by Rule 4-501; as a result, as to 
precisely what asserted facts and evidence it must contradict• 
A. Summarv Statement of Disputed and Undisputed "Material" Facts 
as of the December 12, 1994 Oral Argument 
This detailed evidence has been previously presented (ante, 
pp.10-7) and will not be duplicated, Sommer Eg, claimed in its 
Memorandum ("Mem.") (R.pp.105-32) that it was the "registered 
motor vehicle lien holder." (See Mem., p.l). However, those 
ultimate legal conclusions were based upon assertions in the 
•Undisputed Facts" section of the Memorandum (see Mem. pp.1, 2, 
7) which were not supported by any admissible evidence in the 
summary judgment "record" before the trial court, let alone by 
undisputed facts. Conspicuous by their absence are any 
affidavits under oath by Wayne Sommer or by Dale Mickelson. 
However, it is worthwhile to re-emphasize that those 
unresolved genuine fact issues were not necessary to be resolved 
pursuant to Trans Tech's positions as to what common law legal 
principles are controlling. (See post, sees.Ill, IV and V) On 
the undisputed fact record as developed to that date, 
December 12, 1994, the claimed seller's lien of Sommer Eq. was 
-void" or "voidable", unenforceable and invalid. Indeed, there 
vas no evidence in that record even purporting to give Sommer Eq. 
such a lien. The backside of the Purchase Agreement (P-2, D-14) 
purporting to give such a seller's lien was not in the record at 
•that juncture—only the front sheet was. 
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B. Sommer Eo/s Motion For Partial Summary Judcrment was, at Best 
from its Point of View, Premature Because Key "Material* 
Evidentiary Facts had not been Proven by It to be Undisputed 
The Utah Supreme Court cautioned in Frederick May & Company, 
supra, that when the "record" before the trial court vis a vis a 
motion for summary judgment ".••indicates that other evidence 
would be produced if the issues of fact were tried...it would be 
a wise policy for the trial court to deny summary judgment where 
such complicated legal questions are presented and determine the 
issue of fact by trial." (368 P.2d at 270; emphasis added). As 
of the December 12, 1994 oral argument, this was precisely the 
situation. Wayne Sommer had not yet answered under oath Trans 
Tech's extensive and detailed written interrogatories as to what 
happened during that March, 1991 sale of the Truck. The 
prejudicial error of the trial court in nonetheless granting 
Sommer Eq, the partial summary judgment adjudications, became 
only to clear during the trial when Wayne Sommer's testimony 
pinpointed the gaping chasms in the summary judgment record vis a 
vis the "material" evidence. 
Sommer Eq.'s motion should have been summarily denied and the 
parties left free to proceed with further discovery, and to prove 
at trial via "relevant" admissible evidence what really happened 
and why during the March, 1991 "sale" of the Truck to "Jack W. 
Sommer". See, e.g., Callioux v. Progressive Ins> Co>, 745 P. 2d 
838 (Utah App. 1987) (generally summary judgment motions should 
be denied when discovery is incomplete). As of the December 12, 
1994 oral argument the trial court's prior order to Wayne Sommer 
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to answer Trans Tech's written interrogatories under oath, had 
still not been complied with* 
C. Sommer Eg. did not Prove that Either Wavne Sommer or 
Jack W. Sommer Actually gave it a Valid Written 
Seller's Lien on the Truck Which was Then Enforceable 
Sommer Eq. had to prove via undisputed ••material0 evidence in 
the summary judgment HrecordM before the trial court on December 
15f 1994 that there was a legal and factual "basis" (i.e. 
statutory, contract or common law) for its alleged seller's lien 
and its priority claim (e.g., a valid enforceable lien at the 
time Trans Tech commenced its work on the Truck in late 1993). 
Cf.9 e.g., Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678, 680-1 (trial 
court's summary judgment adjudication reversed). Sommer Eg. had 
the burden of demonstrating that "...the winner is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law". Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 
368 P-2d 266, 268 (Utah 1962). "Such showing must preclude as a 
matter of law, all reasonable possibility that the loser could 
win if given a trial". Id. See also e.g., Foremaster, Movant's 
Burden in a Motion for Summary Judgment, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 731/ 
734-7. Cf., e.g., FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594 
P.2d 1332f 1334-5 (Utah 1979) (trial court's granting of summary 
judgment reversed). 
The fragmentary "material" evidentiary "record" before the 
trial court—provided solely by Trans Tech—demonstrated that 
there were numerous genuine issues of "material" fact to be 
resolved by the jury at trial under the erroneous legal 
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principles embraced by the trial court. Accordingly, there was 
no need for Trans Tech to have interposed any other contradictory 
evidence (e.g. via affidavit). Sommer Eq.'s summary judgment 
motion should have been summarily denied because it failed to 
satisfy its demanding burden of proof. Cf., e.g., Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 
Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); Reeves v. Geicrv 
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah App. 1988). 
Indeed, summary judgments are wappropriatew as to fact-evidence 
oriented issues (e.g. negligence) "only in the most clear-cut 
case". Bowen, 656 P.2d at 436. See also, e.g., Thompson v. Ford 
Motor Co.. 395 P.2d 62, 63-6 (Utah 1964) (two Justices concurring 
in result). Like principles govern false notarization-"fraud" 
issues, such as the ones posed in the "material0 evidentiary 
record in this case as of December 12, 1994. 
For example, there must have been a valid (e.g. non-
fraudulent) written sale contract signed by whoever the buyer 
really was in March, 1991, which unambiguously gave Sommer Eq. a 
seller's lien on the Truck, in order to satisfy Utah's statute of 
fraud requirements. Cf. e.g. Rainford v. Rvttina, 451 P.2d 769, 
770-1 (Utah 1969); Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 
P.2d 827, 830-4 (Utah App. 1989) (Judge Jackson dissented only as 
to the holding, not the legal principle itself). (See also post, 
sees.Ill,IV) Yet there was no such document in the evidentiary 
record before the trial court on December 12, 1994. Since there 
were genuine disputes as to one or more "reasonable inferences" 
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to be drawn from the -material" evidence in the record, the trial 
court prejudicially erred by granting partial summary judgment 
adjudications vis a vis those fact issues. Id., 780 P. 2d at 
831-2 (reversing trial court's granting of summary judgment). 
Cf. also e.g. Freed Furnace Co. vs. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 
1039 (1975) (reversed trial court's summary judgment; held 
genuine material fact issues as to holder of claimed mortgage, 
including estoppel, existed); Beehive Brick Co.. supra, 780 P.2d 
at 830-2. 
The Utah Motor Vehicle Act's provisions concerning perfection 
of a lien (see post, sec.V) "...assumes the [present] existence 
of a security interest [valid and enforceable under the U.C.C.] 
when the application for a certificate of title was prepared and 
filed." Cf., e.g., Ozark Financial Services v. Turner, 735 
S.W.2d 374, 378-9 (Mo. App. 1987). The mere notation on the Utah 
Certificate of Title (P-3) that there is a seller' lien does not 
create the lien, it merely creates a rebuttable presumption that 
such a lien had been created by the requisite written contract. 
Cf- Lake Philaas Service v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951, 953-4, 957 
(Utah App. 1993) (refused to enforce an invalid, inaccurate Utah 
Certificate of Title stating who the owner was). See also e.g.. 
Picking v. State Finance Corp., 263 A.2d 572, 573 (Md. 1970) (no 
written security interest signed by owner of auto); Auto Ace. 
Corp. v. Univ. C.I.T. Credit Corp., 139 A.2d 683, 685, 688-91 
(Md* 1959) (fraud by dealer-seller); 7A Am. Jur. 2d, supra. §26 
("..•except evidence to establish fraud which would cause such 
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certificate to be voidable..."). The evidence in the record as 
of December 12, 1995 rebutted that presumption as a matter of 
law. Evidence extrinsic to the required written contract, the 
Purchase Agreement (P-2,D-14), which raises false notarization"-
fraud issues relating to their creation, is sufficient to rebut 
that presumption for summary judgment purposes. Cf. e.g., 
Rainford v. Rvttincr, 451 P.2d 769, 770 (Utah 1969). 
D. Assuming, Arguendo, that a Valid Lien was Initially 
Created by the Buyer when the Truck was Purchased by 
Jack W. Sommer and/or Wavne Sommer, there were 
"Material** fact Issues as to whether it would be at 
that Juncture Equitably Unenforceable (e.g. Because of 
the Knowing Participation of One or More of Sommer 
Ea/s Representatives in the Fraudulent Creation of a 
Falsely Notarized Certificate of Title Stating that 
"Jack W. Sommer" is the Legal Owner of the Truck, when 
this was not the Truths 
It was undisputed as of the December 12, 1994 oral argument 
that Sommer Eq.'s employees-representatives had deliberately 
violated their duties in March, 1995 to comply with, and to also 
require compliance of the real buyer of the Truck, with Utah's 
statutory provisions governing the issuance of the Certificate of 
Title (P-3) in the name of "Jack W. Sommer." Accordingly, Sommer 
Eg, should have suffered the legal consequences of their 
deliberate derelictions. Cf., e.g., 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, 
S42(5). Sommer Eq. should be barred in equity from enforcing its 
purported seller's lien against third persons, such as a 
subsequent innocent creditors-encumbrances (e.g., Trans Tech). 
Id. at 301. There was no bona fide sale to "Jack W. Sommer" or 
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to his son, Wayne Sommer, and accordingly no bona fide creation 
of a seller's lien in that "false notarization" transaction. 
Equity principles focusing upon the reality of the underlying 
1991 "sale" transaction involving the Truck, prevail over false-
fraudulent statements contained in the Certificate of Title (P-
3)i which resulted from the falsely notarized underlying 
triplicate application for Certificate of Title form* Cf., e.g., 
Dahl v. Prince, 230 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1951). The Utah 
statutory registration requirements are for the protection of 
innocent persons giving value in good faith, not to deprive 
innocent persons of their equities. Id. at 33-1. Accordingly, 
it is mandatory that the statements made in the underlying 
triplicate applications for Certificate of Title, be accurate and 
truthful, and mirror the real underlying transaction. Otherwise 
equitable estoppel principles bar enforcement of the claimed lien 
addressed in the Certificate of Title (P-3). Cf. e.g., Wayne 
finance Corp. v. Shivar, 174 S.E.2d 876, 878-80 (N.C. App. 1970). 
Yet it was undisputed in the December 12, 1994 summary judgment 
record that W. Anderson had falsely notarized a signature as 
being that of "Jack W. Sommer," which was not his. 
Equity will not enforce contract documentation involved in 
and arising out of a fraudulent "sale" of a motor vehicle. See 
e.g., Drettmann v. Marchand, 59 N.W.2d 56, 57-9 (Mich. 1953) 
(fraudulent sale transaction involving auto in which maiden name 
of one of participants was utilized, rather than her married 
name; equitable lien fashioned in favor of innocent-defrauded 
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lender of money). Cf. e.g., Laun v. Kipp, 145 N.W. 183r 190-3 
(Wis. 1914). A false certificate of title cannot prevail in 
equity vis a vis a person who has in good faith parted with 
value. Estoppel is utilized to bar a person involved in the real 
transaction from relying upon statements in the Certificate of 
Title which are incompatible with the reality as to what really 
occurred. Cf. Carpenter v. Devitt, 122 P.2d 79 (Cal. App. 1942) 
(son remained registered owner of auto which in realty was 
purchased and paid for by father). Consider in particular 
Dissault v. Evans, 261 P.2d 822, 824-6 (Idaho 1954) and the 
numerous cases cited therein. 
A false certificate of title obtained during the course of a 
•fraudulent- transaction will not be enforced vis a vis an 
innocent bona fide party parting with value without knowledge as 
to what really happened. Cf., e.g., Automobile Finance Co. v. 
Mundav, 30 N.E.2d 1002, 1006-7, 1011 (Ohio 1940) (false 
certificate of title stating there was a lien on the auto was not 
enforced because the lien (chattel mortgage) adverted to, was 
held to be invalid; no "constructive notice" resulted therefrom). 
Such a -certificate of title- was "improperly issued and is void-
in the hands of one who knows of its falsity. JLd. at 1009. Cf., 
e.g. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Gall, 229 N.E.2d 845 (Ohio 
App. 1967) (held owner of auto under false certificate of title 
could not enforce the certificate against bona fide purchaser for 
value). 
Automobile Finance, supra, went on to holds 
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Besides, the certificate of title, being issued 
upon the false representations of Munday and/or 
Northside Auto Sales, was void ab initio. The very 
purpose of the law is to protect ownership against fraud. 
Therefore, the certificate of title introduced in 
evidence on behalf of appellant (plaintiff below) is 
clearly invalid, and the appellant has no right to 
rely upon same. 
(30 N.E.2d at 1010; emphasis added) 
This Certificate of Title (P-3) also was "invalid" and "void" as 
of December 12, 1994. The Ohio Supreme Court in Automobile 
Finance went on to also hold that the lienholder was estopped 
from attempting to enforce its lien. 30 N.E.2d at 1010. 
II. UNDER UTAH LAW, TRANS TECH'S PROPOSED COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST 
SOMMER'S AUTO WRECKING FOR THE DAMAGES IT HAD SUSTAINED AS 
A RESULT OF THE MARCH, 1991 FRAUDULENT-"FALSE NOTARIZATION" 
SALE TRANSACTION IS MANDATORY AND, ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT TO BE ASSERTED IN THIS 
ACTION 
The proposed Counterclaim is in the Addendum. The 
allegations are based upon 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Notary Public, §25# 
Wilful misconduct, which points out: 
...there is no dissent from the proposition that a 
notary who wilfully and knowingly violates his 
official duty, as by certifying to a false 
acknowledgement, is liable to one injured thereby, and 
the party injured by such wilful act of the notary is 
not bound to prove that he acted in reliance on the 
false certificate in order to recover from the notary 
or the surety." (emphasis added) 
!Phis legal principle covers W. Anderson's March 13, 1991 "false 
notarization" of the purported signature of "Jack W. Sommer" in 
the triplicate application for the Certificate of Title, like a 
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glove. Accordingly, Trans Tech promptly moved to amend its 
initial pleadings shortly after obtaining the needed evidence via 
Dale Mickelson's written interrogatory answers, after it could 
not wait any longer for Wayne Sommer to answer his written 
interrogatories. 
Rule 13(a), U.R.C.P., dealing with "compulsory 
counterclaims", provides: 
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim 
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader 
has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of 
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its 
adjudication the present of third parties of whom the 
court cannot acquire jurisdiction* But the pleader need 
not state the claim if (1) at the time the action was 
commenced the claim was the subject of another pending 
action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his 
claim by attachment or other process by which the court 
did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal 
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating 
any counterclaim under this Rule 13." (emphasis added) 
There can be no doubt but that Trans Tech's proposed amendments 
(see copy thereof in Addendum) setting forth the additional 
Counterclaim for damages (compensatory and punitive) does indeed 
arise out of the very same March, 1991 transaction-occurrence 
that is the subject matter of Sommer Eq.'s claims set forth in 
his Amended Complaint. Accordingly, unless asserted in this 
action, this claim cannot ever be raised—period1 
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III. THERE IS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, NO VALID SIGNED 
AGREEMENT IN THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT GIVING 
SOMMER'S AUTO WRECKING A SELLER'S LIEN ON THE TRUCK 
AND ACCORDINGLY NO "CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" THEREOF WAS 
GIVEN TO TRANS TECH 
The provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, as 
supplemented by common law equitable principles, govern the 
requirements for creating a valid legally enforceable seller's 
lien on the Truck. See e.g., 79 C.J.S. Supp., Secured 
Transactions supra, §§1-2, 4, 6-9, 11, 14-6, 75, 92; 68 Am. Jur. 
2d# Secured Transactions §150. (See also ante, pp. 24-5) There 
must be a valid signed written "agreement" expressly giving 
Sommer Eg. the claimed seller's lien in the Truck, which is 
signed by the buyer-owner-debtor. Id., §§20,22 (fraud vitiates 
validity). There was no such "agreement" signed by the stated 
buyer "Jack W. SommerH, or indeed, even by Wayne Sommer. (See P-
2, D-14) 
There must be an accurate description of the parties to the 
transaction in order for the agreement giving the lien to be 
valid. 79 C.J.S. Supp., supra., §39. This never happened in 
that March# 1991 transaction. The Purchase Agreement falsely 
states that the buyer-owner-debtor was "Jack W. Sommer". (See P-
29 D-14) It does not expressly purport to give Sommer Eq. a 
seller's lien on the Truck, except via the words hidden 
inconspicuously among the boiler-plate provisions on the back 
side of the triplicate form pages. On March 1, 1991 the front 
page of that form was signed illegibly by Wayne Sommer in blank 
(i.e, nothing filled in)—without reading it or having any of the 
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various terms on the back called to his attention or explained to 
him. He was never given a copy of that form he signed—either 
before or after Dale Mickelson had filled in all the blanks. 
Accordingly, that Purchase Agreement is "unconscionable," 
both "procedurally" and "substantively", and unenforceable-
invalid. See e.g. A & M Produce Co., v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal.App. 
3d 473, 186 Cal Rptr. 114 (Ca.. App. 1982) (terms inconspicuous 
on back side of written contract form, unequal bargaining power, 
terms not read or understood; held contract "procedurally" and 
msubstantively" unconscionable). 
Wayne Sommer's trial testimony put at issue the legal 
validity of both the triplicate Purchase Agreement form and the 
triplicate application for the Utah Certificate of Title form. 
See e.g. 3A C.J.S. Alteration of Instruments, §§73-80. The name 
of the buyer-owner of the Truck is, of course, a critical subject 
which can result in these documents being legally invalid. Id., 
$§37-9,41,42. The filling in of the wrong price by Dale 
Mickelson also rendered it invalid. Id., §46. The evidence as 
to the filling in of the blanks in those two forms on March 13, 
1991—almost two weeks after Wayne Sommer signed them—raises the 
-material" fact issue whether or not the blanks had been filled 
in in accordance with the orally agreed upon (i.e. within the 
limited authority of the personfs] filling in those blanks), Id, 
§§73,79. Moreover, Wayne Sommer's testimony that none of the 
blanks in those two triplicate forms were filled in, in itself 
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pinpoints a fatal defect rendering both of those documents 
legally invalid, even though initially signed by him, Jd., §76, 
Id., §79 points out: 
•••For example, a party who writes his name upon a 
blank piece of paper does not, except in a case where 
the doctrine of estoppel applies, become bound on an 
obligation thereafter written thereon, unless it can 
be shown that he gave the person who wrote it proper 
authority to do so, and as between the signer of an 
instrument and the party to whom the instrument is 
intrusted, the signer cannot be bound by the 
unauthorized filling of blanks, or the excessive 
exercise of authority in filling blanks intentionally 
left to be filled. (p.340; emphasis added) 
!Ehis result is in accord with the general contract principle that 
there was never the requisite "agreement" between the parties, 
even though the blank forms had been previously signed by Wayne 
Sommer. See e.g. 17 CJS Contracts §30,31,65. Cf. e.g. 
Engineering Assoc, v. Irving Place Assoc., 622 P.2d 784, 787 
(Utah 1980) ("...parties had not given mutual assent to all the 
essential terms...") 
A valid enforceable seller's lien "attaches" to the Truck 
only If and when a valid (e.g. non-fraudulent) written agreement, 
expressly giving the seller that lien, is signed by the stated 
buyer, "Jack W. Sommer". 79 C.J.S. Supp. supra., §24; 68 Am. 
Jur. 2d, supra. §§358-9, 361. This is necessary in order to 
satisfy Utah's statute of fraud requirement. Cf. e.g. Rainford v. 
ftvting., 451 P.2d 769, 770-1 (Utah 1969); Beehive Brick Co. v. 
Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827, 830-4 (Utah App. 1989) (Judge 
Jackson dissented only as to the holding, not the legal principle 
itself)* But there is no such written contract (i.e. signed by 
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•Jack W. Sommer") in the record before this Court (see P-2, D-14) 
and this also is fatal to Sommer Eq.'s seller lien claim. See 
also e.g., Picking v. State Finance Corp., 263 A.2d 572, 573 
(Kd. 1970) (no written security interest signed by owner of 
auto); Auto Ace. Corp. v. Univ. C.I.T. Credit Corp.. 139 A.2d 
583, 685, 688-91 (Md. 1959) (fraud by dealer-seller). 
IV. ALL THE SALES DOCUMENTATION CREATED IN THE MARCH, 1991 
"FALSE NOTARIZATION"-FRAUDULENT SALES TRANSACTION INVOLVING 
THE TRUCK WERE "VOID* AB INITIO OR AT LEAST "VOIDABLE" 
This Court should adjudicate, as a matter of law, that all of 
the documentation involved in that March, 1991 false notarization 
sale transaction, were "void" ab initio, not merely "voidable"• 
(See e.g. ante, pp.25-9) The trial court cited no legal 
authorities to support its decision to the contrary. Such a 
legal result is just, not only vis a vis innocent creditors such 
as Trans Tech, but also with other respect to other innocent 
parties, such as Jack W. Sommer. It appeared unequivocally at 
trial that Jack W. Sommer was not a party to that March, 1991 
transaction and that he had tried in vain since early 1992 to get 
Ted Sommer or Dale Mickelson to get his name off that Certificate 
of Title (P-3). Even complaining to the State of Utah in early 
1994 could not yield results. Accordingly, it is up to the Utah 
common law to afford such protection to the innocent. 
The necessary major premise for the trial court's summary 
judgment and trial rulings in favor of Sommer Eq., was the 
erroneous legal conclusion that there had been in March, 1991 a 
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non-fraudulent sale transaction. See e.g. Meyer v. General 
American Corp.. supra. Even if Jack W. Sommer would have 
appeared before W. Anderson personally and would have personally 
signed in his presence the March, 1991 sale documentation, the 
transaction nonetheless should be held fraudulent and set aside 
(i.e. declared "void") under the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
vis a vis creditors of Wayne Sommer's (e.g. no "consideration" 
therefor). Cf. eg. Rosenheimer v. Krenn, 126 Wis. 617, 625-8, 
105 N.W. 20 (1906). Jack Sommer was not the real buyer and the 
net result would have been to insulate the Truck from the 
creditors of Wayne Sommer—the real buyer. See also e.g. Meyer 
v. General American Corp., supra. However, it is not necessary 
to resolve this issue in this appeal; after Wayne Sommer's trial 
testimony it was clear that it never happened that way back in 
March, 1991. 
!Ehe trial court's erroneous legal conclusions (R.pp.748-52/ 
844-9) completely miss the point vis a vis the decisive legal 
issues. Section 70A-1-103 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
provides: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of 
this Actf the principles of law and equity, including 
the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to 
contract/ principal and agent/ estoppel/ fraud, 
misrepresentation/ duress9 coercion/ mistake/ 
bankruptcy/ or other validating or invalidating cause 
shall supplement its provisions. . (emphasis added) 
Accordingly/ long well-settled common law "fraud" and "good 
faith-bad faith" principles/ which are nowise "displaced" by the 
^particular provisions of" the Utah Uniform Commercial Code/" 
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-invalidate* all of the March, 1991 sale documentation, including 
the Purchase Agreement's recitation among the back side's 
•boiler-plate" terms, of a seller's lien. See Mever v. General 
American Corp., supra. 
Indeed, section 70A-1-203, U.U.C.C, expressly provides that 
•(e)very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation 
of good faith" in its performance or enforcement. "Good faith" 
in turn is defined in section 70A-2-1Q3 as requiring not only 
honesty in fact, but also the observance by Sommer Eq. of 
•reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade". 
See also, Official Comment to § 70A-1-203. Section 70A-1-201(19) 
states "(g)ood faith means honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned". See also, § 70A-2-103(b). Sommer Eq.'s 
conduct during its handling of the March, 1991 sale transaction 
to •'Jack W. Sommer" nowise satisfies these standards—even as to 
Wayne Sommer. Accordingly, all the sale documentation is "void" 
or at least "voidable" at the option of innocent third-parties 
(e.g. creditors), such as Trans Tech. See e.g. Mever v. General 
American Corp., supra. 
It has long beenf of course, well settled in Utah, as well as 
in other states, that fraud (e.g. in such a sales transaction), 
and in the creation of the documentation involved therein, 
renders the documentation "void"—not merely "voidable". See 
e.g., Gerrv v. Northrup, 227 P.2d 857, 859 (Cal. App. 1951) 
(-...the lien she would of obtained would be subject only to 
prior valid liens or titles" and accordingly, "(i)f any of the 
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apparent encumbrances did not really exist, i.e., if they were 
fraudulent and void or voidable,..."). There was at least 
"material" issues of fact to be resolved at the trial in the 
light of all of the evidence, including full and unfettered 
cross-examination of the two key witnesses still alive, Wayne 
Sommer and Dale Mickelson. 
Hence it will not make a major difference in this appeal 
whether all the documentation involved in, and arising out of, 
that March, 1991 "false notarization- sale transaction was "void" 
ab initio or merely "voidable". But the just rule was recited in 
Gerry, supra, 227 P.2d at 857, is that at least "(s)o far as 
existing creditors are concerned...", "(i)n the case of a 
fraudulent conveyance or mortgage, the law regards such on 
instrument as being void...". The March, 1991 "false 
notarization" triplicate application for Certificate of Title 
form (D-2) and the resultant 1991 Utah Certificate of Title (P-3) 
certainly deserve that fate. See also e.g., Lucas v. Coker, 113 
P*2d 589, 550 (Okla. 1941) ("...conveyances in fraud of creditors 
have, from the earliest times, been void at common law..."); 
Raapke v. Beacom, 144 N.W. 815, 816 (Neb. 1913) (held fraudulent 
deed was ••void"). Cf., e.g., 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §42(5); 
7 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 39 (vendor fraudulently participating in 
obtaining a false certificate of title is estopped). There was 
no bona fide sale to "Jack W. Sommer" and accordingly no bona 
fide creation of a seller's lien in that March, 1991 transaction. 
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The Utah Legislature wisely and justly requires that the real 
"Jack W. Sommer- must have signed the Utah Dealer Registration 
Record (D-2) under oath before a -notary public-. But in this 
instance the -notary public- was W. Anderson, Sommer Eq.'s office 
manager. W. Anderson betrayed the trust placed in him by the 
State of Utah when it appointed him -notary public- and violated 
his statutory legal duties delineated in Utah's Notary Public 
Reform Act. See § 46-1-1 through 46-1-19, Utah Code. 
V, THERE ALSO WAS NOT THE REQUISITE -PERFECTION- OF THE CLAIMED 
SELLER'S LIEN AND ACCORDINGLY NO "CONSTRUCTIVE 
NOTICE THEREOF WAS GIVEN TO TRANS TECH 
In order for the security interest (i.e. seller's lien) 
purportedly given by the backside of the Purchase Agreement to 
have priority vis a vis the lien rights of innocent creditors, 
such as Trans Tech, the -seller's lien" jnust have been 
•perfected- so that it could give the fictional -constructive 
notice* of that lien to innocent creditors such as Trans Tech. 
79 C.J.S. Supp, supra,. §25-29, 56, 58. (post, sec.V) But there 
was no -perfection- of Sommer Eq.'s claimed seller's lien because 
a valid Utah Certificate of Title (see P-3), was never issued by 
the State of Utah. Id., §§32-3, 47. (See also, ante, sec. IV) 
The Utah Motor Vehicle Act's provisions concerning perfection 
of a lien merely "...assumes the [present] existence of a 
security interest [valid and enforceable under the U.C.C.] when 
the application for a certificate of title was prepared and 
filed*• Cf., e.g., Ozark Financial Services v. Turner, 735 
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S.W.2d 374, 378-9 (Mo. App. 1987). The aforesaid Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code rules are applicable to motor vehicles, except 
insofar as these rules have been modified as to the "perfection" 
of valid enforceable liens by special statutes (e.g. requiring 
certificates of title to perfect) 79 C. J.S., supra., §§32-3, 47. 
Accordingly, the mere notation concerning a lien on the 
Certificate of Title (P-3)—even if it had not been fraudulently 
obtained and/or falsely notarized—was not sufficient to 
•perfect". The lack of the required valid Purchase Agreement 
giving Sommer Eq. the seller's lien (see ante, sec.IV) means 
legally that the claimed seller's "lien" was never "perfected". 
The notation on the Utah Certificate of Title (P-3) 
concerning a seller's lien does not create the lien; it merely 
created a rebuttable presumption that such a lien had actually 
been created by the requisite signed valid Purchase Agreement. 
Cf. Lake Philaas Service v. Valley Bank, supra 845 P.2d at 953-4, 
957 (Utah App. 1993) (refused to enforce an invalid, inaccurate 
Utah Certificate of Title stating who the owner was). See also 
e.g., Picking v. State Finance Corp., 263 A.2d 572, 573 (Md. 
1970) (no written security interest signed by owner of auto); 
Auto Ace. Corp. v. Univ. C.I.T. Credit Corp., 139 A-2d 683, 685, 
688-91 (Md. 1959) (fraud by dealer-seller). The evidence 
rebutted this presumption as a matter of law. 
The seller's lien must be "perfected" before there can be 
•constructive notice" thereof given to innocent creditors such as 
Trans Tech that do not really know thereof. 79 C.J.S. Supp., 
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supra, §25-29, 56, 58. Motor vehicles are reguired to be 
•registered in the name of the owner...". If Am. Jur. 2d, supra, 
§33. This reguirement exists to prevent the very type of fraud 
which led to the State of Utah issuing its 1991 Certificate of 
Title (P-3) falsely stating that "Jack W. Sommer" was the owner 
of the Truck. The Utah Legislature reguired that the real "Jack 
W. Sommer" must have personally signed the Utah Dealer Record (D-
2) under oath before a notary public. But this never happened 
and this was legally a fatal deficiency. See e.g. 1A C.J.S.f 
Acknowledgments, §§1, 3-4, 7-8, 11, 13-5, 21, 49, 52, 70-2, 79, 
85# 95-6. Accordingly, there was no "perfection" of Sommer Eg.'s 
claimed seller's lien, as a valid Certificate of Title was never 
issued by the State of Utah. 79 C.J.S. Supp., supra, §§32-3, 47. 
1A C.J.S., Acknowledgments, §11 points out: 
"Upon the alteration after acknowledgment of an 
instrument, to which acknowledgment is essential, a 
new acknowledgment is necessary, and, where 
acknowledgment is necessary to the validity of the 
instrument, the filling in of blanks, the alteration, 
or correction of the instrument will be of no force 
and effect without another acknowledgment." (emphasis 
added) See also Id., §49. 
Wayne Somer's trial testimony that he signed the triplicate 
application form in blank triggers this principle. 
79 C.J.S. Supp., supra, §60 points out: 
-An unperfected security interest is subordinated to the 
interests of a lien creditor under the Uniform 
Commercial Code provision conferring such status with 
respect to a person who becomes a lien creditor without 
knowledge of the security interest and prior to its 
perfection, and under earlier similar statut(esn£hasis added) 
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Since Trans Tech's owners-officers, Mr. and Mrs. Strebel, did not 
know of the existence of Sommer Eq.'s claimed lien until after 
the 1993 repair work on the Truck had been completed, the claimed 
seller's lien does not have priority. 
W. Anderson falsely stated, as the "notary public," that it 
was "Jack W. Sommer" who had personally appeared before him on 
March 13, 1991 and who had personally signed the triplicate 
application for a Utah Certificate of Title. In doing so, he 
betrayed the trust placed in him by the State of Utah in 
appointing him "notary public" and violated his statutory legal 
duties delineated in Utah's Notary Public Reform Act. See 
S 46-1-1 through 46-1-19 Utah Code, particularly § 46-1-2, 
46-1-10 ("...intent to deceive or defraud") 46-1-15 ("...notary 
public is liable to any person for all damages that person 
proximately caused by the notary's misconduct in performing a 
notarization")• 
The Utah judiciary in fashioning its equitable common law 
principles to govern the issues posed by Trans Tech in this 
appeal, should effectuate the "public policies" embodied in, and 
reflected by, the Utah Legislature's statutory enactments. 
Utah's "public policy" concerning such notary public fraud is 
strong and uncompromising. Teeth are put into these statutory 
requirements by not only providing for civil remedies, but also 
by criminalizing the prohibited conduct. The knowing possession 
of the false Utah Record (D-2) is a class A misdemeanor under § 
76-6-522, Utah Code; the knowing falsification of the Utah Record 
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(D-2) in the name of "Jack W. Sommer" is a class B misdemeanor 
under § 77-6-504, Utah Code; defrauding of creditors (e.g. of 
Wayne Sommer's) is interdicted by § 76-6-511f Utah Code. 
W. Anderson's deliberate misuse of his notary public office 
is a class B misdemeanor under S 76-8-201, Utah Code. Section 
76-8-414# Utah Code, provides: 
Every person who knowingly procures or offers any 
false or forged instruments to be filed or registered 
or recorded under any law of this state or of the 
United States, is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. (emphasis added) 
In the same vein, the making of a "false" statement under oath 
before a notary is a class B misdemeanor under § 76-8-503, Utah 
Code, and where, as here, made in writing with a intent to cause 
the issuance of a false Certificate of Title (P-l)f is a class B 
misdemeanor under § 76-8-504, Utah Code. 
The offending notary public is liable both civilly (i.e. for 
all damages-losses caused thereby) and criminally for his 
transgressions—acts of misconduct. See e.g., 58 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Notaries Public, §§23-4, 25, 28, 30. Cf. also e.g., Id.. §31 
("fraudulent acknowledgment") See also e.g., 66 C.J.S. Notary 
Public §§ 10(a) (liable for "wilful misconduct"), (c) (duties as 
to ensuring re acknowledgments that person signing document 
really is who he claims to be (i.e. "Jack W. Sommer")); 11(a)(e) 
12; 13. See also 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Notaries Public, §§25, (Wilful 
misconduct (ante, p.44), §31 ("fraudulent acknowledgement"); 66 
C.J.S. Notary Public §§ 10(a) (liable for "wilful misconduct"), 
(c) (duties as to ensuring re acknowledgments that person signing 
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document really is who he claims to be); 11(a)(e) (civil 
liability; notary -guilty" of misconduct in the performance of 
his official duties may be held liable to persons damaged 
thereby" for all damages-losses "caused" thereby), 12; 13. 
Equity should refuse to enforce such fraudulent-"false 
notarization" sales transactions vis a vis innocent creditors, 
such as Trans Tech, with liens on the Truck, Cf., also e.g., 37 
Am* Jure 2d, Fraudulent Conveyance §§ 167-8, 172, 176; 37 C.J.S., 
Fraudulent Conveyances, §§ 278, 312, 314, 319, 327. Nor would 
there be any "perfection" of Sommer Eq.'s seller's lien. See 
e.g. Automobile Finance Co. v. Mundav, 30 N.E.2d 1002, 1006-7, 
1009-11 (Ohio 1940) (held that a false certificate of title 
stating there was a lien on the auto was not enforceable (e.g. 
estopped; the lien (chattel mortgage) adverted to is invalid and 
no "constructive notice" resulted therefrom; the "certificate of 
title" was "improperly issued" and "void" ab initio)} Hardware 
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Gall, 229 N.E.2d 845 (Ohio App. 1967) 
(held owner of auto under false certificate of title could not 
enforce the certificate against bona fide purchaser for value). 
1 Am. Jur. 2d, Acknowledgments, §75 points out: 
mIf a statute requires that an instrument must be 
acknowledged before it may be recorded, and the 
certificate of acknowledgment is materially defective, 
so that it does not establish, actually or presump-
tively, that there was a valid acknowledgment, then 
the actual recordation of the instrument will not 
impart constructive notice to third parties. This 
rule has been applied to a variety of defects." 
See also Id., §80-5. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should rule as a matter of law that (1) Trans 
Tech's mechanic's lien had priority over any legal rights Sommer 
Eg. might have had vis a vis the Truck, and (2) that Sommer Eq. 
must pay to Trans Tech the amount of all the damages which it has 
suffered as a result of not being able to go forward with its 
1993 sale of the Truck. In the alternative, a new trial should 
be ordered vis a vis all the genuine "material" fact issues 
relating to the Amended Counterclaim and Trans Tech's Answer 
thereto. In any event, this Court should order a trial upon the 
allegations set forth in Trans Tech's proposed Amended 
Counterclaim. 
t Respectfully submitted this // day of June, 1995. 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney for Defendant 
Transmission Tech, Inc. 
Ross R. Kinney 
Attorney for Defendant 
Transmission Tech, Inc. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
TED SOMMER dba SOMMER'S AUTO 
WRECKING, 
Plaintiff CASE NUMBER 930014410 
DATE 12/16/94 
VS HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER 
JACK W. SOMMER, WAYNE SOMMER, 
and TRANSMISSION TECH, INC., 
Defendants 
This matter came on for hearind on plaintiff's and 
defendant Transmission Tech, Inc.'s motions on December 12, 
1994, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler presiding. Plaintiff 
-was present and represented by counsel, Gayle Dean Hunt and 
Steven A. Wuthrich. Defendant Jack Sommer was not present or 
represented by counsel; defendant Wayne Sommer was present 
without counsel; defendant Transmission Tech was present 
through counsel, Steven H. Lybbert. The Court having heard 
argument of counsel, having reviewed pleadings filed in this 
matter, and being fully advised in the premises, now rules as 
follows. 
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1. The plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment 
against defendant Transmission Tech is granted; the defendant 
Transmission Tech's counter motion for partial summary 
judgment against plaintiff is denied* 
2. Although plaintiff further argued that its summary 
judgment motion should be applied to defendant Wayne Sommer# 
the plaintiff's written motion and documents submitted with 
that did not seek relief as against that defendant. 
Accordingly, no ruling is made as to Wayne Sommor, and that 
matter shall proceed to trial along with all other issues not 
resolved by this ruling. 
Pursuant to U.C.A. 41-la-601 through 604, plaintiff 
perfected its security interest in the subject vehicle. 
There is no evidence of any fraud occurring in the 
transaction, as the undisputed facts presented at oral 
argument show the defendant, Wayne Sommer, to be the 
purchaser-debtor of the vehicle, and the same person who 
signed his name to the purchase documents. Although he 
placed the vehicle in*his father's name, he made no material 
misrepresentation on which Transmission Tech relied to its 
detriment. 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Ted Sorrier dba Sommer's Auto 3 
Wrecking, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Jack W. Sommer, Wayne Sommer, 
and Transmission Tech# Inc., 
Defendants.
 t 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
i Case No. 930014410CV 
\ Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
The above matter was tried before the Court on December 21, 
1994• Plaintiff was present and represented by Gayle Dean Hunt 
and Steven A. Wuthrich. Defendant Jack W. Sommer was present and 
represented by Ralph J. Marsh; defendant Wayne Sommer was present 
and represented himself; defendant Transmission Tech was present 
through David Strebel and was represented by Steven H. Lybbert 
and Ross R. Kinney. The Court having heard testimony of 
vitnesses and argument of parties and counsel, now finds and 
rules as follows. 
On March 13, 1991, plaintiff and defendant Wayne Sommer 
entered into a contract whereby defendant was to purchase a 1981 
Ford vehicle from plaintiff. The total purchase price was $9761. 
Mr, Sommer paid $1000 as a down payment, leaving a balance due of 
$8761. Pursuant to the contract, the plaintiff held title to the 
vehicle until payment was completed in full. There were no 
written terms regarding how the balance was to be paid. Although 
a reasonable assumption could be made that the balance was due 
immediately, there was no evidence offered by plaintiff that any 
demand was made for the balance at that time or subsequently. 
Wayne Sommer admitted that he made no further payments on 
the vehicle. He further acknowledged that the balance of 
payments are due# and that he believes he owes only $4500 to 
$4700 for the following reason. On various occasions in 1991, 
Mr. Somer painted equipment for plaintiff, and he believed he 
should receive credit against the debt for his work performed. 
He admitted that he had been paid on a "per piece" basis for that 
work, but that he had not been paid in full. Plaintiff testified 
that he had been fully compensated for the painting jobs. The 
Court finds Mr. Sommer's testimony regarding credit against the 
debt not to be reliable, because he failed to provide any 
specific information to the Court regarding the work performed, 
the time period, any balance owed him for the work, or any 
agreement that he was to receive any credit. 
Based upon that, the Court finds that the defendant Wayne 
Sommer owes the plaintiff the sum of $8761, the balance owing 
irader the contract. Because no agreement was evidenced regarding 
monthly or other payments and plaintiff made no demand for 
payment, there is.no evidence that the debt was overdue until 
this action was filed. Therefore, prejudgment interest should be 
calculated beginning with December 1993, when this action was 
commenced• 
Pursuant to the terms of the contract, plaintiff is entitled 
to a reasonable attorneys fee against defendant. Based upon the 
evidence submitted, the Court finds a reasonable attorneys fee to 
be the sum of $2882.50, plus costs of $179•00, for a total of 
$3061.60. 
As to defendant Jack Sommer, the Court finds no liability 
for the debt owed to plaintiff. There is no evidence that he 
entered into any agreement with plaintiff to purchase or pay for 
the vehicle. Although Wayne Sommer placed his vehicle in Jack 
Sommer's name, based upon their relationship as son and father, 
that provides no liability on the underlying debt, which is 
solely owed by Wayne Sommer. 
As to Transmission Tech's claim against Wayne Sommer, the 
Court finds as follows. On August 19, 1993, Transmission Tech 
and Wayne Sommer had preliminary discussions about Mr. Sommer's 
need for a new engine in the 1981 Ford. Transmission Tech 
verbally estimated the cost to be $5000; however, after the 
vehicle was examined, Transmission Tech gave a second verbal 
estimate of between $5000 and $6000. 
On October 22, 1993, Transmission Tech performd the work of 
putting a new engine in the truck for a cost of $6250. 
Additional work was also performed to overhaul the engine and to 
replace or repair other parts, all of which was authorized by Mr. 
Sommer, with the exception of some minor charges. The total cost 
of Transmission Tech's work was $10,432.48. Mr. Sommer 
acknowledged that the work was authorized, that it was necessary, 
and that the charges were legitimate. He also admitted that he 
has paid nothing on the debt. Based upon the evidence received 
in this matter, the Court finds the work was authorized by Mr. 
Sommer and the amount charged was reasonable for the work 
performed. 
Based upon Mr. Sommer's failure to pay the repair bill, 
Transmission Tech has retained the vehicle and seeks a judgment 
for the repair bill, storage fees, and prejudgment interest. The 
Court finds that Wayne Sommer owes Transmission Tech the 
principal amount of $10,432.48, plus prejudgment interest at ten 
percent per annum pursuant to U.C.A. 15-1-1, and storage fees in 
the sum of $2130.00 through the date of trial. 
As to defendant Jack Sommer, the Court finds no liability 
for the debt owed to Transmission Tech. No evidence was 
presented that he contracted for or even had knowledge of the 
repair work performed. 
As to Transmission Tech#s motion for rule 11 sanctions 
against plaintiff, that motion was not argued. The Court finds 
no basis to award rule 11 sanctions based upon the evidence 
received at trial, and therefore denies the same. 
Pursuant to the ruling of this Court on December 16, 1994, 
that plaintiff's lien is superior to that of Transmission Tech, 
the plaintiff is entitled to have the possession of the 1981 Ford 
for enforcement of its lien through commercially reasonable sale, 
and Transmission Tech should be ordered to release the vehicle to 
plaintiff. Transmission Tech's motion for authority to remove 
the engine or other parts presently on or in the vehicle is 
denied. 
Based upon the above, the Court awards a judgment to 
plaintiff against defendant Wayne Sommer in the sum of $8761 
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pursuant to the contract, plus attorneys fees and costs in the 
sum of $3061.60. Defendant and cross-claim plaintiff 
Transmission Tech is awarded a judgment against defendant Wayne 
Sommer in the sum of $10,432.48 for repair work on the vehicle, 
plus prejudgment interest pursuant to U.C.A. 15-1-1 and storage 
fees in the sum of $2130.00 through the date of trial. 
Transmission Tech is ordered to release the vehicle to plaintiff 
for sale. 
Plaintiff's counsel is directed to prepare findings, 
conclusions, and order consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this o\ day of February, 1995. 
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5 . -*V*»cft w <t*«*fm «r *nrfu«o« •<« <«M« «tf I N ojon»4r< «^cN4voi W«4» 
lor |h« «W<«a WMINVKt (JOOUC11H CWCfU«*NOY.. 
^ 
;f%oM M**«r v» 0*t+«tp ?<^4*>V » ix«p*> I IWK ntw»» of Aufhorif(HI 
6ry 
i r-Aff-;,?,^:- t 
t* 
U-i-.;' i * o u « r S ^ 
NEW LIEN.HOLDL R tNJrpf WfciM oTcnrfd) * '. » 
ttoncss 
OTY 
) I I K I 1 II 
L12£*: L 
-4- .U.«*A 
.2»». 
Svmmm of Ow>«ir)Aufhoru«i Auo^ < • * . . f 
S!RRSgHflS!5«i^ v 
2 ,/», H 
o-t, 
utALtH KbUlbTRATION RECORD 
UIAIISIAIC lAXt.tjMMi:.'*..!! M« H<* I VI IMU.4 M.IM* 44 Ufj*. M«.»Kll #wl Mil* '*«U I.AKC ClU .Uf 84 I lC itt) »l 538-d30*l 
1. CAR TRUCK 
2. OWNER INFORMATION 
• iVVNl l< NAi.U I.UI 
.IM i. u suiitii.r. 
: :. TRAILER M O T O R C Y C L E . ^ SNOWMOBILE OFF-HIGHWAY.. 
K f M M W l f (ilt hlT. 
\ 
.mi r r ADuitt:SS_L^J_l,I.L'lIL!LJ.-iL 
• m •ly.JLUA.X fiiAir_UI 7iP.^'«ii?J.axiNrY_H.l.. 
SHADED AREA FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
EXPIRATION MONTH/YEAR 
JAN' FEB/ 
APR/ MAY* 
JUL/ AUG< 
OCT' NitV 
MAR/. 
JUN/_ 
SEP/. 
0£C/_ 
NEW PLATE NUMBER 
9 6 2 4 CN 
3. VEHICLE INFORMATION 
VIN / SERIAL 
NUMBCR I 1 UXKtt«iHXHVJU/iHi/i 
. IM I V , H I M A K C _ . > ' . " • « ' • M W I M H V I - V I I ^ 
• • < • • • • i n • .IHM1 l i t ' 
HtCvKXlSPLAIC* . 
• aM*;*: vvrK%4 ir u>* tn«t.r. •«vi«_A./l54P.M 
«i*•< K r i-jv.*; oiFsr i X MK«fAi r « MI ITM_ _. 
1 . OUOMETER DISCLOSURE SIA1EMENT 
Putci cxloniolor reacting exactly as shown in seller's i l iv 
< kisuie on cuirent title. 
I 4 M J I llllllCAISNG U C C K U C 
I " I At lull MA*.**.* 
I . . . . * V *?.Vfi!! I I t . M*»;«»* «;M:IIHJS ntOClul.-C.il INIMIS 
4l.Ui-i«4 I.*******. mm-mitM ^ . _ , . . . 
. _ _ Nm At:lu.-rJM**:kP' j .» 
yH\OunRey 
^ Oup Tme 
^ - W t Incc 
Sales Ta* 
WHEN SOLD. 
PREVIOUS REC. INFO. 
UTAH PLATE # / g K ^ r ^ t y ^ ' 
EXPIRATION nATC A ~*J ' 
EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP ^ ^y» 3 < £ V ) / i.' 
uiAiiliuriin t ' f * ~ ' OLD? 
>\jt.iii T.tm a * 01 Sime Tit* MSO 
M M , i - t l.ii - i f H I Ji:.w..mf I.iv ilii.l _AIUJ3vit 
.^i4ii*i«..ii«'.if ' . * .. .Cutui Onfci <* Mcdi L««II -_Mcrotisch 
PLATE TRANSFER INFORMATION 
niCvKHJ-; VIN . . _ _ _ _ _ _ « _ . 
?y+b7V 
PREVIOUS WEIGHT. 
CURRENT TRANS ACT ION INFORMATION 
Tt fhs Type 
A,Pl.Uc»Ml-
5. TOR LEASED VEHICLES ONLY 
I l l SSII 'SMAMI' 
M H H V ^ « \ » " » £ j t * - * '• » * 
J» 1! Y ^ SIAIC L_ 7* * COUNl Y 
16. FOR VEHliTLESFINANCEDBY LOAN 
U i n i / i m w y r SOtMniif APTO t.T.EiT.Ti.i; 
L U M M - * * '•'•? W . D U O r,u 
|t irv^* L / ^ r J L SIAIC U T TrJillLULujUiil v-
1 
J?JLl 
Plate Type 
__P<HS0lUllt«.Hl 
I>SAI**J 
a«ho 
NatlGuatd 
Fi»mnt 
_A|* joiUomaJ 
750 trailer 
Special 
F<**Qn Vet veto 
_ N a m e Change Ort. 
_ Survivor stop 
U f t O u n v t 
Com Passenger 
Repossess*** 
Partial Yr I 
Rcourfl 
NOTF 
PROPERTY TAX CLEARANCE 
TAX AREA 
VALUE 
»K 
7. FOR FLEET VEHICLES ONLY 
A<:<:< M I N I NUi.ilIFII _ 
M K U ' . r AM1MIIMM4 H 
0. PURCHASE AFFIDAVIT 
FLCXI* NUMRI n 
INIItA".fAIC F XI MP I 
IUIAL PUIICNASE PRICE $ . 
LIT»!i ALLOWANCE FOR TRADE-IN VFl IK.LC * . 
NT t PURCHASE PRICE S
 m 
tNAUf *IN yi Hi^ ikn 
IRAOr-INVINOR 
S^.IUALNO 
IF F. KEMPT. SIAIE REASON . 
VIN vEniricATiori (ALL OUT OF STATE VEHICLES) 
I imvc i*. i r * . . *^ Hf^tfx'i'Hi ti«' vHncie UuscmxHl m section J .n«s IM«I llvj 
li*uii|4i'«i !••(••• i:<«i<t,i ;if SI own 
!JGIHI»|H Al M 4 I H 4 . I I ) CNfO^.f Ml Nl A<XNCY OAlC 
SALES TAX CALCULATION 
Loan O x i i ^ _ ._Ciiw • * S.ne^ fair Moikei Vame 
LOSS Ti.l(K-itir.M l.l'ii>r»| VMuC 
Not Fat kLwk.t V.A*.. 
SMet Ta« One 
Less Soles T.i* Patl To Ai oilier Slate 
Net Sales Ta« Quo tor Resale Tai # . 
.1 
9 . AFFIDAVIT OF OWNER(S) 
t'Vvtf tlw m«k.t««ji«0 .Mk»ki m«JH a-MH Mt.il. «UUM.1 lo Mw hiii «r«ol«d «i ftfcion 6 
.rfo** l am/Wn aw wv* owneiii) of M « vatvci* cMnlted. MVM aM MMMM nMoiinauun « 
• .4i%»\.w«)«-l*t^k<V'..ii«iiii.aiiw^«iAwV*r..ii»t*<«\»>«r4««Miitt.»»ri»««*Mi r*i *•*» 
SAFETY NSP6C1I0N I v u S a B E f t ^ l L i l i z i i ! 
UCENSED DEALER REPORT OF SALE 
sui:;u;i'.:: A U T O WRI:CKINC 
EACIflNfMELVOWNER MUST SIGN BELOW 
SUBSCRIBED ANO'SWORN BEFORE ME Tl^S[ j DAY OF. 
NOIARY PUBLIC OR MV. EXAMINER 
COHM tc-sssetcv ices 
COrJlUssioNE^pW! 
tT>rflw Hnn+S 
NEW USEOJL DEALER NUMBER ^217 
(TATE s m n U J / 1 J / 9 TEMPORARY PERMIT NUMBER . J $529*1, 
I. IhL* aoove I U H C U dr.*a«ei certify ««(tlas wticie rv.s been ciekveieo to the 
purchaser named iw»\. Itvii the Mitornuion MI this refiort is tiua ai«J correct 
#na Conines WI»I UC4I«J«?. MKl that, MI urn rcpo*?mg ol sates and use Ua 
as loa^tMi bv UC S9-1?> tOrtOI 
v I am curreiK. or I am not current 
|[1f <X/' i^fA>. ^ ^ y / / ^ V 
(siyitatute ol Oealer or authorized represeitiati u 
EXAMINING OFFICER NUMBER. rtt$ 
&? EXHIBIT B 
UTAH REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE 
UTAH STATE U X COMMISSION. MOTOR VEHICLE C ^ S O N 1095 MOTOR ^ N U E SAULAKE CIT 
n** 
jjTIREET ADDRESS. 
CITY - * * - 1 9 A 4 . ^ ^ C T J T T >'Y a p _ g * U : r » CQUNTy ? l 
3. VEHICLE INFORMATION 
% CAr \_ jTRUCKJ^ TRfllEB , MOTORCYCLE 
2. OWNER INFORMATION ' . i ^ ^ ^ W N l ^ R ? Y P £ r 
OWNER NAMElS) mJ~ y _ " 
SNOWMOBILE 
I SHADED AREA FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
(^EXPIRATION MONTH/YEAR 
HtfawsStiafciv, 
.M&OEL il&J 
«f^ g - ^ J i f c ^ ^ -** • C Y U N Q E R S 
flijbsS WEIGHT i i p t a i ^ ' y 4 ^ ^ " • > • • . - • , j 
C f t E C K F : G A S _ DESEL^J;" PROPANE ' OTHER 
4 . O D O M E T E R D I S C L O S U R E STATEMENT * 
'Enter odometer reading exactly as shown in seller's dis-
c l o s u r e on current title.. 
•OOOMETERREAONG / *>CCKONE:
 : 
(Miles or Kjtometers.no tenths) . Mileage exceeds mechan^ frnfo 
. Not Actual Mileage 
5. /FOR LEASED VEHICLES ONLY 
ADDRESS. 
CTTY. .STATE. . Z I P . .COUNTY.^ 
6. FOR VEHICLES FINANCED BY LOAN 
U£NIK>LDERSNAMP j , ' , ' ' ' ' ^ ' ^ ' , (m Vt* ' ^ ' ' ' I M M I * ' ' 
Q T V • *•* C * ^ STATE *''*' 2 P : : , : " ' - < ' COUNTy S* 
7. FOR FLEET VEHICLES ONLY 
ACwM- »f NUMBER 
Ofc > . . * APPORTIONED 
FLEET N U M B £ R _ 
frTTRASTATE EXEM^r " 
16. f-^.CHASE AFFIDAVIT 
I *» J»i i ' • <RCHASE PRICE $_ 
j LEii • * J.GWANOE FOR TRADE-IN VEHICLE $« 
KETH-.-^HASE PRICE $ . 
TRADC-H y i**"» 
TRADE-Hi VIN OR 
SERIAL NO. 
r EXEMPT. STATE REASON•« 
J A N / . 
APR/. 
OCU 
— FEB/ 
J. MAY/ 
— AUG/ 
_ NOV/ 
WHEN SOLD-
JUN/_ 
S E P / . 
D E C / . 
NEW PLATE NUMBER 
9 6 2 4 CHI 
n PREVIOUS REG. INFO. 
UTAH P L A T E # ^ * f ± ± ^ f 2 £ l 4 i ' ' « 
EXPIRATION D A T E _ i L ^ . 
EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP
 0 . f / , ?.s;s./ . 
[UTAH TTTLE NO c / • -" -. ^  . m r w ^ • 
JScttahTair*- Out Of State Title ^ . M S O . ^ 
Utah Due, Tide App. * " . .U tah Salvage Title (SC) Affidavit 
—CertrfcajeoTSate* ' Court Order or Mech. ban _ M o o f « c h 
PLATE T R A N S F E R I N F O R M A T I O N 
PREVIOUS VIN: 
PREVIOUS PLATE#: PREVIOUS WEIGHT. 
CURRENT TRANSACTION INFORMATION :y.- ' 
Trihs Type 
_ ! . Plate/title 
. . P l a t e Transfer 
^ R e n e w a l 
Plate RepL 
^Oup.Reg. 
DujxTide 
.Wtlncr. 
.Sales Tax 
Plate Type 
« _ _ Personalized 
.Radio 
.Natl Guard 
.Exempt 
.Apportioned 
.750 Trailer 
Special 
rni ign VWaOe 
. . . N a m e Change Only 
...Survivorship 
—..Lien Change 
. . C o m . Passenger 
Partial Yr.( ) 
Rebuilt 
NOTE:. 
PROPERTY TAX CLEARANCE 
T A * A W £ A 
u m t g _ ^ •«-
I ~" 
*4\V 
VIN VERIFICATION (ALL OUT OF STATE VEHICLES) 
I have personally inspected the vehicle desaioea m secten 3 and fmd the 
description to be correct as shown. 
SIGNED (PEACE OFFICER) ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
SALES TAX CALCULATION 
Local Code Bill Of Saie^_Fa«r Market Value $ 
Less Trade-in Fair Market Value $ 
Net Fair Market Value S 
Sales Tax Due S 
Less Sales Tax Paid To Another State S 
DAT!; 
Net Sales Tax Due (or Resale Tax #_ 
-) 
9. AFFIDAVIT OF OWNER(S) 
S^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ *^-^ -^  f ^ ' a ^ o o m p M e . aid »»ul 
UCENSEO DEALER REPORT OF SALE 
H£M__ uynx , 'KAIERNUMBER. 
^ SODOJillli^O*"^ ^££5d£»™~-
iSSS^sSssSi&M8 
I«< M M A M with w * 1 * * « • * * * 
"NOTARY PUBLIC OR M.V. tXAMP^R 
"OWNCRISI SIGNATURE (&"* * " ~ •—' - * » * "*> «~~ TSftSSfe^^S. V j ^ T E O BY UTAH MOTOR \ 
fOHMVC^MCHEV 10/10 
63 
IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
REGISTRATION NOT VALID UNTIL SIGNED BY THE REGISTERED OWNER(S) AND APPROVED BY THE 
MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION. 
YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LICENSE PLATES ISSUED TO YOU FOR THIS VEHICLE. IF VEHICLE 
IS SOLD OR DISPOSED OF, REMOVE YOUR UCENSE PLATES. PLATES MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO 
ANOTHER VEHICLE IF REGISTERED IN THE SAME NAME(S). OTHERWISE PLATES MUST BE SURREN-
DERED TO THE DIVISION WITHIN 20 DAYS. REGISTRATION CARD ALONG WITH A NEGOTIABLE TITLE 
MUST BE SURRENDERED TO THE PURCHASER OF THE VEHICLE. 
WITHIN 10 DAYS AFTER .ADDRESS CHANGE, SEND WRITTEN NOTIFICATION TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE 
DIVISION. 1095 MOTOR AvCNUE. SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84116. 
FEES 
PASSENGER PLATE * TITLE $ 18.00 
TRUCK PLATE & TITLE <a 6.000 $20.50 
TRUCK PLATE & TITLE <w 9.000 $2tt.00 * PLUS SALES TAX IF DUE * 
TRUCK PLA1E & TlTLE @> 12.000 $43.00 
TRAILER PLATE & TITLE $ 14.50 
MOTORCYCLE PLATE & TITLE $ 14.00 
THE FEES USTED ARE THE MOST FREQUENTLY USED FEES. IF VEHICLE FALLS INTO A CATEGORY 
OTHER THAN THOSE ABCVF EXAMINING OFFICER WILL COMPUTE FEES. OR YOU MAY CALL 
f^JH-ttiOt). (WITKDAY:*. ^ AM 1<»:. i i«".. 
* • ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED FOR TITLE AND REGISTRATION ARE: 
NEGOTIABLE TITLE / NOTARIZED ir REQUIRED 
.SAFETY INSPECTION CERTIFICATE 0ATFD NO MORE THAN CO DAYS PRIOR TO APPLICATION. 
.EMISSION INSPECTION FOR RESIDENTS OF SALT LAKE. DAVIS AND UTAH COUNTY. 
GURHt-NT OUOMETER READlNC: ENTER ODOMETER READING AND CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX 
EXACTLY AS SHOWN ON TITLE BEING SURRENDERED. 
.PROPERT" ~.V< CLEARANCE IP OI.IF 
POLICE OFFICER INSPECTION OF VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER REQUIRED ON OUT OF STATE 
VEHICLES. 
INFORMATION MtJf.T BF COMPIETf AND IFGIRIX 
RFG'STRATION CERTIFlCATL MUST BE CARRIED IN VEHICLE AT ALL TIMES 
64 
StLLtK: 
3 IA 6^j=^tJ^y. 
VtMiULt bUYfcH 5 ORDER AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
±s 7 
(btjff'K 
Mfi-^L A 
" ^ o u n t y Suit Z*>Code 
Res Phone Bus Phone 
tWe hereby order frorrvyou and agree to purchase from you subject to all terms, conditions and agreements contained herein, and the conditions printed on 
reverse side hereof the\llowing vehicle. ^ ^^^
 m ^  w J 
SALESMAN. 
SERIES- rxoG .BODY TYPE 
_ ^ DNEW EtJSEC 
jLt«L*^r fk COLOR -
ED DDEMO YEAR 
.ODOMETER 
ir.i.n STOCK NO.. 
MAKE. 
DEL 
.DATE •. s-A-rl 
* y^flgi CASH SELLING PRICE 
ACCESSORIES OPTIONS 
USED TRADE-IN AND/CR OTHER CREDITS 
MAKE OF TRADE-IN MILES 
YEAR BODY TYPE SERIES 
V.I.N. 
BALANCE OF $ . .OWEDTO-
TO BE PAID BY: O PURCHASER D SELLER 
ADDRESS 
GOOD 
UNTIL: 
VERIFIED 
BY: DATE: 
USED VEHICLE ALLOWANCE 
BALANCE OWED ON VEHICLE 
NET ALLOWANCE ON USED VEHICLE 
DEPOSIT 
CASH WITH ORDER 
TOTAL CREDIT (Transfer to Left Column) 
DOCUMENTS — Signed and Received 
D Title (If not, explain: 
D Registration 
ZJ Odometer Statement 
3 Bill of Sale 
O Out-of-State Aff. 
Z Power of Attorney 
Z Auth. for Payoff 
EHICLE WITH ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS 
ERVICE CONTRACT 
lfton ^g& 
OTHER TERMS AGREED TO: 
DCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE 
JB TOTAL 
HADE ALLOWANCE 
OCABLE AMOUNT 
TAH SALES TAX 
DENSE & REGISTRATION is 
*-*»^£> 
JOPERTYTAXDUE 
IF-<L 
TATE INSPECTION 
t 
Purchaser agrees that this agreement includes all of the terms and condi-
tions on both the face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels 
and supersedes any prior agreement and as of the date hereof comprises the 
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to 
the subject matters covered hereby, and that THIS AGREEMENT SHALL 
NOT BECOME BINDING UNTIL ACCEPTED BY SELLER OR HIS AUTHO-
RIZED REPRESENTATIVE. Purchaser by his execution of this agreement 
acknowledges that he has read its terms and conditions and has received a 
true copy of this agreement. 
TAL OF ABOVE ITEMS r-frK-r 3-v^^y 
CONDITIONS 
: - .i s JiZTrfiL?* i.?;DI-K£TOGQ AUf^ M ^ T ^ A U Y AGREED: 
* •;.•: -'.r•••••*' «" '"** ^y^--i^^iCri'r.i;^y<\^^t\cr^j^ ;r:«'c??cw:ng terms and condto^^ 
Tr?.. *;;;'- ;-*c?<;ro' ivss reserved the right to charge IheUst price of new motor vehicles vvithcjt nc??ce *r<s ir,<heev?r>*n3t r?e 
>5?VV-J» ->r •»-«• r e * ¥eh;c!-3 piirch^^erj hereunder i* so changed, the cash delivered price, which ts based on list price effect: ve 
..-• •* *v- ..-. of »fw?ry} w:ii gc^;-'-, ?n ir$u transsc**;;;* But if such cash del ivers price is Increased the buyer nay. if 
•5 -Wi.v / -s *'r;'- : i jch toe rebecs n<ic*. canes! ?n«& ores*. ?n which event ifaused vehicle h£* beer, traded in as 3 part of ms 
r . / u i i - ' ^ ' ^ ^ e i n . v X h u*StC2 v«stac*fc snail be ^ t j -nea to the purchaser upon the payfT*em ol a r^sona&e charge rcr 
r *>r^  - i %-«u iwOiiri {if a .^y > crs Jf tfc» *sc;3 v«*hic?s ha* h^en previously sold by the dealer, the amount received therefor, less 3 
v:?:- "•: >v~.r?;3SK;-*i or ' ^ *rv« an/ s^psnso tocu^ec? in storing, insuring, conditioning or adver?is:nc* said vehicle tor saie. 
cOrl .:r: f<?-^':ec io the p^rch-ss^r 
"* v.-: ..••. • -' -^vr * :re? ? t:.; cf-:-;?>•*> * the -.I ^ i n ^ ; <vH ;?f s^-e *rid the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery of 
-*.•«:?. •ri-*-*,».:?e »~ *r*e $<•?•** cooclit*or* ana wrw^nincj ;r«e s&rne equipment as when appraised resionabis wear and ts^r 
•-. rx^>:T -rd*K\-r^>^;:tt'vr3nts$j?;^^^ 
• '1 ; :.•».; \ . : . : •-; >- :'f * J ^ T •'•" ?hg ?..;.-•:..*• s^vr •;: complex S3sd rurchsseforany reason other thar* Conciliator* or account 01 
•—: * r • :; n ;:??•» r*e ^ s - i 0*20*'. > «:;a> b^ renvneci as ;|q*iid<t!Od 3*mtige$. or in the event d ; » i ven.:cte has been taker ir 
?:•:•:?••.. rrt*; -.**%• 'j.zzet h?:'^vy CLcth^riT^ ;i'.:2;^" co *#;.' $£id used vehicle, snd the dealer sh«n b-s en-.-tfed tr> '^rr-bu^se h lm^ ; : 
•:»*:: or rhi; z-Xrt:(;> 0* ^u*;•: s t^*>f for the wpe.'v^c ^pe^ified <n p&rsgjaph 1 above and tAsc trs r»s f>>.pt-n&&s and !OSZB? 
.-•>•: •::..: IT i^-fr.-ed 35 the r^ -.?Us. o? pu?cr-•>•>£«'* b*i>u"fc: io cornriiete sa^d purchase. 
*
:
 :. • ' ^ , . . i - j {X f c : : -^". !/•?> ?:g?>rto r.^ .- ,^?:••;•/ c$^-:'i-^5 ;n ire rr.odel or dx:i?gn 0? any accsssc ' ^ i ?.n^ par? of any nev- rnoto 
•*.e rfyi'hcu: c^>i?-;C i r > ct>::^^ :0:* w?- Uv:- p<irt or either th^ Ds^ie^ of ?h* M'snurscturer. to ni/iK* 
:. >cirr cr\?7-.&}-i ir i-'-t; v^hNv^ covsx^ fcy *r=;» aa'•ien^nt either bero?e or subsequ^?- *•:, :'*'•••$ dtlWvry of such v^hk:^ '•f * , . : ; . * 
t !>*••:•^»vsh^;ii^^l&fr-*i-»b?£: •o«\?fi5ysc3;;-K':dr>> ?•*«^  rri-^r-rjfcsCi-jre?; accidents; suret'es. fires, or ctr^r ;.^u56i D<3/onc !he cent "o 
z - v V.- " . ' ' .v^,*- :* S A - ^ ^ ^ C r n O ' - P / ^ j ^ D A??. r-/^Dt: OR W I L L BE DZBAZD7Q HAVE ^^^'-. M^DEBVEiTHERTHf 
ZTr-LZ* f:r- - ' ^ MA^Uf'.v:-T\> t:-: 0-" T r t ^EV^ -MOTOR VEHICLE OR WOTOH VtH'CuS Ch^S§i3 FUR-%?3H£: 
v*- -r ..4?-r-i?V. •-'C::::;'";.:'v.'i Q^L? T;•**;• ^ y j ^ ^ E ^ '•' •'••'•vf*'? EC; WARRANTY APrLfCABLE"TC SUCH /EHlGLr. OR v;EHICL:. 
:-• v,: :•:••. -A^-:r- ^ A R ^ . ^ V V r< KSCORK^ATEC HIRS-N AND MADE A PART HEREOF A$--JD A COPY C- WH^CH W L^ ?. 
r i . >£:..V£r:£r; TO -UROHAStH Ar ""HE TiMS OF DcUVcRY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR ivTOTOS VEHiCLS 
C^^S!:-:^ ?-JCH vVAP.^ANTY S H A ; . L Be F.;sP«ESSLY i*N HSU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY. CXPRESS OR J M P U E D 
. f . : -UD:MO. BUT KCT l i ^ *TED TO. ANY ? f /K j£0 WARRANTY OF MERCHANT ABILITY OR FITSESS FOH A 
• - r ^ 0 . i , A P FU^POSF. AND THE H-£MED;ES SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE. THE ONLY REMEDIES 
-'-.•• ; . ^ : . . r TO V-2Y PERKO^i ^Vi f H R£SPcCT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR V£H?CI.E CHASSIS 
: O *vAr^AN'T
 ?i'5. i..i'-: <- V.:. C- ;.^PL!ED. ARE VAD~ BY THE DEALER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEH*CLE£ 
CR M01OR VENULE C.5v-^V-:r " j r ,N :G ' -C; ^ ^ t U N D E R EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED iN ^R*:TiNO BY 1HE 
O-EALE?- FOR 's'j.-;r. USr.'O MOTOR v.:-W:OLfc OR MOTOR CHASSIS. WHICH WARRANTY. IF SO EXPRESSED ?N 
^p?Tr4G- :s .rr: O? I : O -AT^O n^pf IN ANO MADE A PART HEREOF. 
T ;.- ^ ^ ^ c * v-yh'.c !•? c.c v«rt?d ^ y tb-s asr^r.-jr.-: i;.; 5 u.sc-ii or denionstrator vehicle, no warranty or represont^tion is made *$ »o 
irr* >i»u^i tu^h ^rn>clc ^^r. beon used, regardless or the mileage shown on the speedometer oi $*o used vehicle. 
t?. ?n rr^ f^ve^t t^ar ?t bcc:orrfes oec.e.i/isry to? D-s&vr to enforce any of ibe terms and conditions of • his agreement, purchase 
sg.'cr-t- tc *52y re5^or?abicr s^or^ey's fv>os awl courr co^-s 
?. ^ * ^ a ^ x ^ s ^ t is Non-Transtor2fc!e 
t!* UABT^rTY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED iK-
T>!S AGREEMENT 
•" PURCHASER REPRESENTS that n*-she is IB vears of aqe or older. 
• T *»* r
 T.re v iro vxtxete ts to remain vested in the Qv-iitr until purchase pr.ice is paid ?n fu«i; purchitswr o? a?>ts to dealer a s^ct-rit-
- • •v r - : : ;r» the subject vehicle to secure said payment in full. 
£• f*' ^ j ^ e ^ t r n , verbal 0? ctnerw>?^5 ?;••• conlr?int:c] «n mis agreement will be recogn^ecl 
- • - - »v.^  ^ , r . : r L a ccvert-o by this o^rtfsme::: <s s i.itec! vehicle, the Information you see on we w=nco* fo» rn (Buyers G j«de: 
-- - ••--'*-''f>rm overrides any conf'a,v;rc,-:^:;*';s<r:th^ canine t^^-t 
y I Purcfcaw i Nam* / * 
' O t y X * u n t y S u * ^ 2 ^ C o d » 
fosPhont BusPttont 
weby oider IrorK^ou and agree to purchase from you subject to ail terms, conditions and agreements contained herein, and the conditions printed on the 
> side hereof the\jtlowing vehicle. ^ ^ ^ "
 £ * A/ / & 
MAN. 
CO 
.BODY TYPE. X^l dttjSED DDi DNEW Q J EMO Y E A R / .MAKE -COLOR. 
STOCK NO.. .DATE r ^ w / ^ * " * f / 
.ODOMETER 
SELLING PRICE * y^«. USED TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS 
SORIES/OPTIONS MAKE OF TRADE-IN MILES 
YEAR BODY TYPE SEfllES 
V.I.N. 
BALANCE OF $_ .OWED TO— 
TO BE PAID BY: DPURCHASER DSELLER 
ADDRESS 
GOOD 
UNTIL: 
VERIFIED 
BY: DATE: 
USED VEHICLE ALLOWANCE 
BALANCE OWED ON VEHICLE 
NET ALLOWANCE ON USED VEHICLE 
DEPOSIT 
CASH WITH ORDER ± Ta?)rry> 
TOTAL CREDIT (Transfer to Left Column) 
DOCUMENTS — Signed and Received 
D Title (If not, explain: 
Q Registration 
D Odometer Statement 
Q Bill of Sale 
D Outof-State Aff. 
D Power of Attorney 
Q Auth. tor Payoff 
WITH ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS 
,E CONTRACT 
ENTARY SERVICE FEE 
TAL 
T£ffff 
^ j & OTHER TERMS AGREED TO: 
ALLOWANCE 
: AMOUNT 
iLESTAX =*u 
& REGISTRATION 
TY TAX DUE 
JSPECTION 
F ABOVE ITEMS 
EDITS rTt«mt»rfd trom rtght column) 
Purchaser agrees that this agreement includes all of the terms and condi-
tions on both the face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels 
and supersedes any prior agreement and as of the date hereof comprises the 
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to 
the subject matters covered hereby, and that THIS AGREEMENT SHALL 
NOT BECOME BINDING UNTIL ACCEPTED BY SELLER OR HIS AUTHO-
RIZED REPRESENTATIVE. Purchaser by his execution of this agreement 
acknowledges that he has read its terms and conditions and has received a 
true copy of this agreement. 
QJ9 &\ n/n ) "Ms// 
J T - T S - ? / 
0«lt 
.,.State Tax Commisi.o . 
^ Motor Vehicle Division 
[•$j; _ 1095 Motor AvO. 
*£•' Sa.iUKeO/.Ut.-.i &•;••• 
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KmL • «55ICHM»T Of TITlt BY HtCISTtRtO OWHtB '. | 
OWNER(S) TRANSFER AND OOOMETER DtSCLOSURE 
for* the Sates/Purchase price specified horoln, I (we) tho undersigned ownorfs) /tereby t rans fe r r in 
eorwey and assign all rights, title, and interest to the vehicle described cjn the.face hereof 'to-fS w 
-the New Owner namod below, and warrant the title to be free and dear Of a^ll encomorances.V^^ 
:<xeept a lien In favor of the porson identified below as New Uen-Holder, If any. 7" *:;••>:'; \;r \;" .tf.lrWSjj 
• W D S A L E S / P U R C H A S E PHIGt 
•>••«%.• vat 1 
Nt tWrto* 
I 
——•I 
A VEHICLE. 
By Owner / Authortt«d Afpnt .• (Nan* cnutl b* prtfttod),. 
, , . '".I'**':•*• •>• 4v 
• *? , " * ' tr«rMl«ror / Company N«nw 
;*5hose eurrsnl address Is: Street. 
- rap; ' ^ _ st ' \ %?k>tir •'• • 
thereby certify that on the date of this statement, the odometer reads the mileage here 
* Signature of Transferor in Ink (mutt to nottrifttd) 
/«*->-.•-•• 
^6ighatur« of Joint Transferor (mutt ot notarized) 
-fSu&Scribed and sworn to this . « _ _ - _ day of. 
'&*&.- ^ 
j^NEW OWNER (Name must be printed) 
:"'• •.•:; -vVk ' -V**3V*"Notary , , ; -.W^S 
^ . l 9 _ ^ ! ^ ; : V ' S e a i * • ^ $ 
Signature of Notary Public or M.V. Examiner, . r / , 1 .^ 
. . • ..;!:, [•';• NEWUSN-HOLPER (Namemust'be 
3g.*MMe-
^ADDRESS. 
^ r . • 
NAME 
ADDRESS; 
READING "» 
•milos (no terttnsj 
>* tho best of my Kx.-. • 
' i* .. .• • 
.ST- .ZIP-, CITY. 
• DEN RELEASE;-;-
v l f e i ^ - v * Sjonatumof Purchaser(NewOwner)•*-• - • : : — V . M ^ » . «->- .^"* . - ' •« '" ' '"-.'•'•• '"r V * * ^ . 1 ' - : 
£w.5£,." . . . ' . • • • • - . . . , . v:—.'••D J I >J.:. ' . :••• ^ v .^ j f iu : ! : 
Bt-AssiGKrr.m or nnf DY i.mKSFcnon J C L O S U R E ^ ^ ^- i> .v^:; ;uv 
I ownertsKhereby transfer,; •> .^11 
1 aALES/PURCHAS;E p;;;CE 
1fei«ar*rte«.%' ;' s 
P4 3/A«rv n«lv«d 
t 
-i-?*c%5r. * * OWNER(S) TRANSFER AND OOOMETER DIS LOSURE 
jfcVihe Sales/Purchase price specified herein. I (we) the undersigned *owner(s) 
-convey and assign all rights, title, and interest to the vehicle described on the face hereof toHcfr; 
tthe New Owner named below; and warrant the title to be free and clear of aQ encumbrances, ?c\l 
%xc4& a fen in favor of the person identified below as New Lien: Holder. If s n y / ; f ^ f * K%f/\; •:/ ? ?v 
:
^S f t , v / tS .§TATE^LAW REQUIRE THAT THE OWNER jSjATE T H E ' ^ A 6 E UPO^ T R A ^ g R J ^ Q l ^ R S H R - O F A V t m ^ t 
-fAILURETO COMPLETE A STATEMENT, OR PROVIDING A FALS^WEMENT. MAY 
jEffi*"' • .. .. . . . '."'*-%*:'!*•? >?.t&. 
IV^-.TnifwIwor/ConipanyNarnt • •* , . , • • • • By Owner/ AuthorUM) A g e n t ' i : ; v / . v . ? . ' ^ 
^ J - . . ( N « M muit b« printed) : .-•; " v ; : , , •»•: •; \>. \ f \ * -.aNtme; must b e p n r S d ) ^ ^ . ^ •.-•••l?:t 
wihcie curTsrt address is: • S m ^ ': • ' •••' • ; v '"•• : r ' ^ - ' ^ ^ " ; ? " V > ^ ! | 
< S ^ T : , ' V : • • • • » • • ' '••*--•••"'•• 7Jp^:^^' - - ' ' V . ^ > , j ^ . m?les (no tentts) 
haraty certiry that on the date of this statement, the odometer reads the mileage here recorded,''ar#™{lo the best of my xrv 
?&$?£&l&$i^^B$^\!*!?a9e r9rJJl^y?^!.uPte^one 91 V* foliovving is checked: ^^ iv l i^V^wS 1 ' 
' RESULT IN F'INES AND/()R IMPRISONMENT. 
« '.rQQtDMETER READING 
A ' j . a ; 
W^jReflects the amount of mileage in excess of the odometer mechanical limits/ 
r j ^ i j s NOT the actual mileage fa this vehicle. WARNING - ODOMETER 
K **5 * _ ' • * * 
l^ftatvf* of Transferor in ink (mutt oe noUriied) 
Ugnttur* of Joint Tr«n$f«ror (mutt be notarized) • 
kib^CYlbed and sworn to this " day of. 
^ J W OWNER (Namemust be pAmqf&j:. . ffcnatum of Nota^ h ^ 
"ADDRESS. 
• " T V 
mecnanicai limns/ ••• - ::. • ; " ^ V W C ^ M J 
X)METER DISCREPANCY. : :i:?.^v t f ® * * 
T r r - r ^ .C: ^ r ^ ^ S e a T > y v ^ f ^ ; V 
•5^ 
NEW UEN-HOLDErt (Name must be! 
NAMt 
»i 
*cSt1i38EEr 
£» -v Signatunj ol Purchattr 
CT • • T I P •• ' • . • . . • • • • ^ • j t f i n B w ^ ^ ^ •.•^.•. t a w w , . „ 
rli 
H LfXAM CODE AMN. | 4 1 - 1 - 6 2 REQUIRES THE OWNER TO REMOVE THE UCENSE PLATES UPON, THE «AL£JOR:DISPOSAL OF A VEHICLE 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 56 (a)-(g), U.R.C.P., provides? 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a 
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days 
from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with 
or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in 
his favor upon all or any part thereof• 
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as 
to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to that day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the 
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleading 
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, 
shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist 
without substantial controversy and what material facts are 
actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon 
make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the 
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. 
Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted 
accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits? further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred.to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto 
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be 
IJB3\146381.2 6/11/95-1 
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supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, supported as provided in this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear 
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order (aaplaas|asfedded) 
Rule 4-501 (2), Code of Judicial Administration provides: 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and 
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall 
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which movant contents no genuine issue 
exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of 
the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and 
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall 
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue 
exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those 
portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, 
and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All 
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record 
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement. (emphasis added) 
qB3\U6381.2 6/11/95-1 
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STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187 
Attorney for Defendant 
Transmission Tech, Inc. 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0890 
Ross R. Kinney, Wis. Bar No. 01009043 
Attorney for Defendant 
Transmission Tech, Inc. 
Quarles & Brady 
411 East Wisconsin Avenue 
Milwaukee, WI 53202 
(414) 277-5731 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
TED SOMMER dba SOMMER'S AUTO ] 
WRECKING, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JACK W. SOMMER, WAYNE SOMMER, ; 
and TRANSMISSION TECH, INC., 
Defendants. ] 
1 MOTION FOR ORDER AUTHORIZING 
I FILING AND SERVICE OF 
I AMENDMENTS SETTING FORTH 
i ADDITIONAL COUNTERCLAIM AND 
i CROSSCLAIM 
Case No. 930014410CV 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
Defendant Transmission Tech, Inc., by its attorneys, hereby 
moves the Court pursuant to Rule 15, U.R.C.P., to enter an Order 
granting it permission to serve and file the attached First 
Amendments Setting Forth Additional Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
within seven days after the date of that Order. The grounds for 
this motion are that the additional Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
simply requests additional relief from parties already involved 
QB3\111390.i 
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^ 
-e*£w q _ 
in this action vis a vis the sales transaction that has been 
involved in this action from the beginning, 
necessitate additional discovery or delay in any way the 
forthcoming trial in this action. 
Dated: November fjP# 1994. 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney for Defendant 
QB3\111390.1 
STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187 
Attorney for Defendant 
Transmission Tech, Inc. 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0890 
Ross R. Kinney, Wis. Bar No. 01009043 
Attorney for Defendant 
Transmission Tech, Inc. 
Quarles & Brady 
411 East Wisconsin Avenue 
Milwaukee, WI 53202 
(414) 277-5731 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
TED SOMMER dba SOMMER'S AUTO 
WRECKING, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
••• J 
JACK W. SOMMER, WAYNE SOMMER, ] 
and TRANSMISSION TECH, INC., 
Defendants. ; 
| FIRST AMENDMENTS SETTING | FORTH ADDITIONAL COUNTERCLAIM 
I AND CROSSCLAIM 
i Case No. 930014410CV 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
Defendant Transmission Tech# Inc., by its attorneys, hereby 
allegess 
1. Incorporates herein by reference all of its allegations 
contained in its initial Counterclaim and Crossclaim. 
2. During the sale of the Truck during March, 1991 there 
vas a fraudulent conspiracy among defendant Wayne Sommers and two 
employees-representatives of plaintiff Sommer's Auto Wrecking to 
falsify and fraudulently create a Utah Dealer Registration 
QB3\1U367. 
Id 
Hecord, utilizii forged s jjrjmat un? dr LI i idl.se notary jurat, 
-which would cause a false-fraudulent Utah Certificate of Title 
being issued stating that "Jack W. SoramerM was Mm pirrrli.v-Hi nf 
and 
Transmission Tech, has been injured its repair 
business as a result of this amages-
,he costs incurred by it 
witli respect to the repair and storage of - "• - Truck, but tJ so i ts 
attorneys fees and other i incurred 
defending this litigation brought by Plaintiff t reliance 
upon the aforesaid Utah Record and Utah Certificate. 
WHEREFORE, Transmission Tech, Inc. respectfully requests 
-that judgment be entered against plaint.il I S n ecking 
and defendanl "I Uv\ III<H ["Jomraer, jointly and severally: 
>r recovery of a 1.1 1 hr compensatory damages wh i ch 
it has incurs J '" Un> • judgment as a 
result of aforementioned fraudulent 
conspiracy, including, without limi , 
reimbursement for ill the reasonable attorneys 
fees and litigation costs which it has incurred to 
the date of judgment? 
B. f o i" i"„ ,i •» • i i,: o v e i, f o f punitive damages; 
C. for the recovery of its costs, disbursements, 
expenses and attorney 
a c t j,on ;,'• iiinnJ 
XJii .i | J i i Jti #.. 
v *„* further relief as the Court may 
D. for such other and further re 
deem just. 
Dated: November , 1994-
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney for Defendant 
Transmission Tech, Inc. 
Ross R. Kinney 
Attorney for Defendant 
Transmission Tech, Inc. 
QB3\11»W. 76 
CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE 
Tl le undersigned certifies that on the following date he 
personally arranged fo: r.he following number? f^ Appellant ",'» 
initial brief to IT>I; c l„a,rts jio^ t. .- • pre-paid, t,.o the 
following persons and addresses: 
8 copies to Appellate Court 
Clerk of the Third Circuit Court 
State of Utah 
451 South 200 East 
S a l t Lake C i t y , IJT 84111 
2. 2 copies to Gayle Dean Hunt 
Gayle Dean Hunt & Associates 
#50 South, 600 East, Suite 250 
Salt Lake, City, UT 84102 
3. 1 copy to Steven Lybbert 
Felt Building Suite 302 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake CI ty, UT 84118 
4. 1 copy to Wayne Sommer 
14600 Majestic Oaks Lane 
Riverton, UT 84065 
5. 2 copies to Steven A. Wuthrich, Esq. 
815 East 8230 South 
Sandy, UT 84094 
Dated this /^< of June, 1995. 
k 
Ross R. Kinney 
One of the Attorneys for Appellant 
QB3\149921. 
